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Abstract
Abstract: When Armenia and Georgia exited the Soviet Union in 1991, massive popular
majorities in both countries voted for independence in nationwide referenda. Over thirty-years
later, Armenia and Georgia have chartered two radically distinctive pathways for their states
within the near abroad. Tbilisi has become a reliable opponent of Russia within the post-Soviet
space as it pursues integration into NATO and the European Union. Yerevan, by contrast, is
closely associated with Russia, and has joined the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. This
thesis employs a comparative framework to evaluate the sources behind this divergence. The
research identifies three determining variables behind this divergence. The first is shared elite
geo-political visions for the state (“constructed realities”), informed by historical and post-Soviet
developments, that shape the national trajectories either towards close association with Russia or
defection to the West. The second is the extent of economic dependence between the subject
country and Russia and the reaction of national elites to that linkage. Finally, the two variables
are mutually reinforcing and serve to confirm the overall trajectory of relations.
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Introduction
In March 1991, the semi-autonomous Republic of Armenia and Republic of Georgia
boycotted Mikhail Gorbachev’s “All-Union'' referendum to reform the Soviet Union and convert
it into the “Union of Sovereign States.” Over the following six months, national authorities in
both republics organized popular referenda on the issue of independence. The results were near
unanimous. With majorities that surpassed ninety-nine percent, the polls demonstrated a clear
repudiation of a continued association with the Soviet Union and preceded formal independence
that same December. But for Tbilisi and Yerevan, independence was not just a rejection of the
Soviet Union; it was a rejection of Russia. Since independence, however, national perspectives
and policies on Russia in the two republics have diverged dramatically. In Georgia, the antiRussian sentiment evident in the 1991 independence movement has intensified, exemplified by
Georgia’s geopolitical alignment with the West. By contrast, Armenia has deepened its ties with
Russia, even going so far as to join Russia in the Eurasian Economic Union. Despite cyclical
electoral and revolutionary changes in the status of elite Caucasian politics, the trajectory of
bilateral relations with Russia has remained consistent in Armenia and Georgia. The causes of
this divergence in Russian relations constitute the subject of this investigation: why do postSoviet states (Armenia and Georgia) embrace different foreign policy trajectories vis-a-vis
Russia? This paper argues that the closeness and contentiousness of Russian relations in Georgia
and Armenia—tracked by engagement with Russian or Western economic and security
institutions—is principally determined by three variables: economic dependency, shared geopolitical visions for the state (‘constructed realities’) among elite actors, and the interaction
between the two.
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This research employs a comparison of Armenian and Georgian post-independence
engagement in Russian-led or Western-led international institutions and bilateral agreements as
an indicator of the status of relations with Moscow. The three variables are analyzed as
motivating causes of a ‘deepening’ or ‘defection’ from Russia as expressed in the direction of
institutional engagement, resulting in a definitive ‘Russia decision’ for each country. The
structure of the thesis is therefore organized into three sections. The first section provides an
outline of the trajectory of Georgian and Armenian relations with Russia and the West from
independence to the present. The second section features a constructivist foreign policy analysis
to argue that national trajectories were determined by shared elite visions for the state within the
post-Soviet space. The third section evaluates the extent of economic dependency, the reaction of
elites to this dependence, and subsequent engagement or defection from Russian international
economic institutions and bi-lateral agreements. A brief discussion of how these two variables
interacted and a review of the key points of comparison then follows before the conclusion. The
subsequent introduction features a contextual review of Russia and the near abroad, the selection
of cases and controls, the discussion of the dependent variable, and the research design and
framework.

Russia and the Near Abroad
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western alliances and institutions have pressed
ever closer to the Russian perimeter. Two NATO members in the Baltic, Estonia and Latvia,
already share a frontier with Russia, and further additions to the borderland coalition remain a
legitimate plausibility, especially in Georgia and Ukraine. The encroachment is supported by
narratives which seek to legitimize the expansion of the Western alliance structure by defending
the strict sovereignty of states to determine their own international affiliations and by expanding
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constructed narratives of a ‘Western’ community.1 Unsurprisingly, Russia has drawn charges of
revisionism following interventions—first in Georgia in 2008 and again in Ukraine in 2013—as
the Kremlin reacts to NATO’s enlargement process.2 Interwoven into Western accusations of
Russian revisionism is the notion of the blizhneye zarubezhye, approximately translated as the
“near abroad.” The phrase, as commonly understood, refers to a Russo-centric geopolitical
concept composed of the fifteen former Soviet republics that attained their independence with
the Soviet Union’s disintegration.3
For many Western observers the term conveys Russia’s acute reluctance to acknowledge
the sovereignty of the former republics and reflects Moscow’s ambition to restore its old sphere
of influence over the adjacent post-Soviet states. The Western view of Russia’s actions has
played into critical evaluations of Russia’s behavior as it pertains to violent entanglements in the
near abroad. After the 2008 Georgian war, for example, Vice President Joseph Biden denounced
Russian designs for a near abroad sphere of influence, a view that was countered by then
President Dmitry Medvedev’s position that it was legitimate for Russia and post-Soviet states to
see each other as reciprocal zones of interest.4 Western scrutiny of Russia’s intent in the near
abroad intensified following President Vladimir Putin’s often mis-construed statement that the
breakup of the USSR was the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the 20th century. Despite the
alarm stirred by analysts that Putin’s statement presaged a grand attempt at re-constituting the
Soviet Empire, Putin was merely reflecting on the exceptional challenge in the post-Soviet states
of managing cross-border networks and national relationships established under the contiguous
Michael Williams and Iver Neumann, “From Alliance to Security Community: NATO, Russia, and the Power of
Identity,” Millennium 29, no. 2 (2000): 361.
2
John Russell “Whose ‘near abroad’? Dilemmas in Russia’s declared sphere of privileged interests,” in Russia and
its Near Neighbours, eds. Maria Freire and Roger E. Kanet (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2012), 113-4.
3
Gerard Toal, Near Abroad: Putin, the West and the Contest Over Ukraine and the Caucasus (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2017), 3.
4
Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Sphere of Interest, not Influence,” The Washington Quarterly 32, no. 4 (2009): 3-4).
1
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Soviet Union. Mainstream Western attitudes toward the practical and theoretical essence of the
‘near abroad’ are woefully insufficient for understanding the geopolitical and emotional reality.
In fact, the phrase predates Putin and his associated foreign policy of assertive and reactive
interventionism. The concept originated in the immediate post-Soviet moment when Russians
were grappling with the change in the territorial status quo.5 As early as 1994, Foreign Minister
Andrei Kozyrev used the term to clarify Russia’s “special interests” in the near abroad.6
The extent of shared historical, socioeconomic, and demographic phenomenon
throughout the post-Soviet space made such an appellation almost inevitable. Near abroad
networks were so extensive that they even molded the development of identity in the constituent
republics and shaped the direction of modern realities and conflicts. Disintegration forced
Russians and their now independent neighbors to address complex issues of cross-boundary
identity, political association, and economic direction.7 Indeed, many successor states within this
category of ‘near abroad’ responded to the challenge by framing their post-Soviet narratives as
compatible, not antagonistic, with Russia. Thus the ‘near abroad’ permeates beyond power
politics, and forms what Gerard Toal described as a “new arrangement of sovereignty and an old
familiarity, a longstanding spatial entanglement and a range of geopolitical emotions.”8 Great
power ambitions were not the only motivations behind the idea of the ‘near abroad.’ Instead,
common features and challenges demanded a conceptual framework for Russians to understand
the post-Soviet republics during a period of exceptional upheaval.
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Toal, Near Abroad, 3.
Bohuslav Litera "The Kozyrev Doctrine - a Russian Variation on the Monroe Doctrine," Perspectives, no. 4
(1994): 45.
7
Zbigniew Wojnowski, The Near Abroad: Socialist Eastern Europe and Soviet Patriotism in Ukraine, 1956-1985
(Toronto: Tornoto University Press, 2017), 207-18.
8
Toal, Near Abroad, 3.
6
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Nevertheless, successor states within the near abroad framework show little uniformity in
their approach to Russian relations. Certain post-Soviet republics, such as the Baltic states, have
invited Western political and economic institutions into their countries, fostering enduring
suspicion from the Kremlin. By contrast, Armenia and Belarus, for example, retain intimate ties
with Moscow and engage in Russia’s multinational institutions. In other states, as in Ukraine,
dramatic vacillations between European integration and Russian linkage confuse any clear
dichotomy. This has been amplified by regional cleavages within Ukraine that sharply divide
along the lines of attachment to Russia (eastern Ukraine) or Western Europe (western Ukraine).
The foreign policy decision for post-Soviet states to either cooperate, and retain close ties with
the Russian Federation, or defect, and pursue affiliation with the United States and the European
Union, can impact the political and economic configurations of the near abroad states. In
Ukraine, the principal catalyst for the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution was national disagreement
over trade negotiations with the European Union, which endangered extant commercial
agreements with Russia. For Russia the spillover from Ukraine and the invasion of Crimea
prompted international sanctions that wounded the Russian economy.9 Clearly, the status of
Russian relations has dramatic consequences for both the economic and political future of states
in the near abroad.

Research Question: Co-operate or Defect?
Relations between Russia and the post-Soviet states evidently matter for both the postSoviet states and for the Russian Federation as well as for broader political stability across
Eurasia. But less discernible are the underlying causes for the alignment; why do states within

Evesy Gurvich and Ilya Prilepskiy, “The impact of financial sanctions on the Russian economy,” Russian Journal
of Economics 1, no. 4 (2015).
9
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the framework of the ‘near abroad’ embrace different foreign policy trajectories vis-a-vis Russia?
In this case, the question applies to Armenia and Georgia, and considers why the former “cooperated” with Russia and the latter “defected” from it.
For some experts in the post-Soviet literature, the attitudes of the post-Soviet states
towards Russia reflect different responses to Moscow’s alleged belligerence. Proponents of this
interpretation assume that the state of relations between post-Soviet states and Russia reflects
Moscow’s revanchist foreign policy in the near abroad.10 Mitchell Orenstein, for example,
asserts that Russia’s "kleptocratic, mafia state" is "determined to reconstruct" the Soviet empire
in the post-Soviet space.11 Timothy Snyder agrees that Putin “chose empire over integration”
invading neighbors in the near abroad to extend Russia’s influence and territorial reach.12
Conclusions such as these form a conventional wisdom that recur throughout the academic
literature. For example, academics have argued in many cases that friendly relations with Russia,
signaled by engaging in Russian international organizations and bi-lateral agreements, are an
indication of coercion on behalf of Russia.13 These relations are generally examined with an
exaggerated focus on Russian initiative and aggression. Fortunately, a growing counter-literature
has sought to reframe the narrative under the theory that Russia either operates in the
international system as a defensive state, or as an isolationist-aggressive power.14 This research
intends to contribute to this counter-literature by examining the sources of post-Soviet relations
beyond a focused emphasis of Russian foreign policy.

Elias Götz and Camille-Renaud Merlen, “Russia and the question of world order,” European Politics and Society
20, no. 2 (2019): 135-7.
11
Mitchell Orenstein, The Lands In Between: Russia vs. the West and the New Politics of Hybrid War (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2019), 11-51.
12
Timothy Snyder, The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2018), 80-1.
13
Laetitia Spetschinsky and Irina V. Volgova, “Post-Soviet or Post-Colonial? The relations
between Russia and Georgia after 1991,” European Review of International Studies 1, no. 3 (2014)
14
Götz and Merlen, “Russia and the question of world order,” 137-42.
10
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To answer this question, the analysis depends primarily upon a comparative research
approach with a selection of two post-Soviet states and a focus on the Transcaucasian region.
Each state has been examined with the intention of analyzing the factors behind each actor’s
decision to cooperate with or defect from Russia. For the sake of convenience, the research
describes this process as the “Russia decision,” though this typology does not imply the decision
was taken at a specific moment. In fact, many of the factors indicate a more gradual formulation
of diplomatic posture beyond the policies of any one administration. Nonetheless, the impact of
specific leaders and elites remains a prioritized feature. This is unavoidable given the established
personalism of Transcaucasian political governments and political parties.15

The Cases: Armenia and Georgia
The historical and political inputs that influence the “Russia decision” necessarily vary by
polity. As a consequence, the research approach requires a robust control system to ensure wide
discrepancies on a state-by-state basis do not undermine the conclusion. Though differences in
historical experience, political organization, and geography potentially could render crossregional comparisons less relevant and less applicable, the examination anticipates challenging
the aforementioned conventional wisdom and illustrating the determinability of a wider array of
forces beyond alleged Russian aggression.
As a result of these cross-regional limitations, intra-regional analysis offers the most
informative and controlled route for analysis. Given the near homogeneity of the Baltic posture
and the isolation of Central Asia from Western influences, the Caucuses have been selected as an
appropriate intermediate region. The region also benefits from its diversity of state actors, who

Max Bader, “Fluid party politics and the challenge for democracy assistance in Georgia,” Caucasian Review of
International Affairs 2, no. 2 (2008): 11.
15

9

maintain distinctive postures in relation to each other and to the Russian Federation. In order to
acquire a divergent set of small state-Russian relations for comparison,, and on account of the
need for extensive control precautions, Armenia and Georgia have been chosen as the research’s
subjects. The advantages of this selection include various controls: 1) limited cross border
conflict, 2) comparable political and economic systems, 3) lack of strategic energy resources, and
4) analogous cultural and historical experiences.
First, Armenia and Georgia have maintained cross-border stability with each other. This
control excludes the possibility that their relations with Russia might be over-determined by the
availability of Russian assistance with, or the lack thereof, in a potential conflict with the other
case selection. Second, Armenia and Georgia enjoy comparable standards of civil and economic
liberty and govern through analogous democratic institutions. Recently, Georgian’s standards
have strengthened relative to Armenia, but throughout the evaluated chronology both states
remained competitive on global freedom rankings.16 Armenians and Georgians, furthermore,
share in the Orthodox religion. The equitability of Armenia and Georgia’s religious
characteristics counterbalances pro-Orthodox biases in the development of Russian and postSoviet foreign policies, which are noticeably vulnerable to interference by domestic Orthodox
churches and clerics.17
A major resource allocation by only one actor would further weaken controls by adding
new strategic considerations. Unlike Azerbaijan, neither Georgia nor Armenia are major energyresource producers, and both are dependent on imported fuel sources and domestic
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Freedom in the World. New York: Freedom House, 1991-2018.
Robert Blitt, “Russia’s Orthodox Foreign Policy: The Growing Influence of the Russian Orthodox Church in
Shaping Russia’s Policies Abroad,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 33, no. 2 (2011): 363463).
17
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hydroelectricity production.18 This is an important control given the heightened likelihood of
inter-state conflict in situations in which one of the evaluated states possesses strategic natural
resources, such as oil.19 For both case selections, the energy issue in the region, however,
remains within the purview of post-Soviet diplomatic trajectories, especially as it pertains to
energy dependency. Further controls are imposed by this selection in the wider economic arena.
The economies of both states are similar in size and composition, allowing for a more effective
comparison of policy choices behind trade relations.
The similarities between Armenia and Georgia also extend into shared historical
experiences and developments under the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of the First World War,
Georgia and Armenia became sovereign states for the first time in five centuries. But these early
republics were short-lived and ceased to exist when the Red Army successfully invaded and
conquered the Caucasian republics during the Russian Civil War. The Bolsheviks subsequently
subsumed Georgia and Armenia, despite extensive local resistance and mass repression, into the
Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, and later, as two of the Soviet Union’s
twenty-one constituent republics.20 In the immediate aftermath of the civil war, the Soviet
government adopted the policy of Korenizatsiia, roughly manifesting as an ‘affirmative action’
program that encouraged the establishment of national elites within ethnic polities and the
promotion of national languages throughout the constituent republics. Under this program and
succeeding Soviet “minority” policies, Georgia and Armenia, already equipped with capable

Demur Chomakhidze “Energy balance of Georgia,” Annals of Agrarian Science 12, no. 3, (2016).
(Francesco Caselli, Massimo Morelli, and Dominic Rohner, “The geography of interstate
resource wars,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 130, no. 1, (2015).
20
Donald Rayfield, Edge of Empires: A History of Georgia (London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2012), 233-66; Simon
Payaslian, The History of Armenia (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2007) 163-70.
18
19
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cultural intelligentsias, asserted the supremacy of their respective ethnic majorities within the
delimited territories of the constituent republics.21
Ethnic minorities within the constituent republics were not always afforded the same
privileges. This formal supremacy of the majority populations within the constituent republics
fed into a cycle of formal repression and ethnic consolidation. In one illuminating instance,
Soviet officials criminalized the linguistic and cultural expressions of the Mingrelian population
in Georgia.22 Despite cultural concessions to the ethnic cores of the constituent republics, Soviet
rule was heavy-handed in the chaotic aftermath of the civil war. Georgia suffered from endemic
political confusion and rebellion, and consequently earned the distinction of suffering under the
direct oversight of the Stalinist security officer, Lavrentiy Beria. Beria suppressed thousands of
Christians, Mensheviks, artists, dissident Bolsheviks, and personal enemies in Georgia
throughout his tenure.23 State-backed repression followed in Armenia, where the Bolshevik
suppression of the Orthodox Church earned infamy for its exceptional brutality.24
The stabilization that followed the consolidation of Stalin’s political control proved shortlived with purges and economic imbalances persisting in the South Caucasus through the Second
World War. Though directly unaffected by the German invasion, Georgia and Armenia were
effectively conscripted into service by Stalin. Wartime fatalities and drastic economic
reconfiguration reversed the demographic direction of Georgia as the country suffered from a
loss of approximately a fifth of its population.25 Armenia suffered a similarly staggering loss rate
with nearly 175,000 casualties.26 The rest of the Stalinist era brought little sociopolitical change

21

Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union,
1923-1939, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 77.
22
Rayfield, Edge of Empires, 351
23
ibid, 347-57.
24
Payaslian, The History of Armenia, 177.
25
Rayfield, Edge of Empires, 363.
26
Payaslian, The History of Armenia, 180.
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aside from preliminary reconstruction through unbalanced central planning and industrialization,
which was often a new reality in the South Caucasus. Relief from “extreme destitution” only
arrived after de-Stalinization as wartime restrictions eased.27 Both countries became eager
participants in the Soviet Union’s pervasive informal economy and enjoyed the partial benefits
of industrialization and modernization, although economic stagnation soon followed in the 1980s
and the region fell comparatively behind.28 Armenian and Georgian intellectual groups, still
subject to occasional harassment, persisted in their efforts to consolidate the gains of
Korenizatsiia and expand the cultural and territorial agendas of their respective republics.29
Political power, however, remained the strict purview of the communist leadership as militaryintelligence authoritarians and conservative apparatchiks maintained power. As elsewhere in the
Soviet Union, independence movements accelerated following the practical destruction of the
Communist Party’s organizational power in September 1988.30
As mentioned in the introduction, Georgia and Armenia exited the Soviet Union with
comparable enthusiasm for secession. Both of the states boycotted the reformist March 1991
Soviet referendum and voted overwhelmingly for independence in national plebiscites the same
year. As an indication of their new separatist postures, Georgia and Armenia embraced an initial
position of ambivalence, if not outright hostility, towards Russia, by refusing to join the new
Commonwealth of Independent States.31 Universal hostility, however, was noticeably shortlived. Over the next seventeen years, Tbilisi and Yerevan chartered divergent courses in their

27

Rayfield, Edge of Empires, 369.
Edmund Herzig, The New Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, (London and New York: The Royal
Institution of International Affairs, Chatham House Papers, 1999), 120-2.
29
Payaslian, The History of Armenia, 184-5.
30
Richard Sakwa, “The Soviet collapse: Contradictions and neo-modernisation,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 4, no.
1 (2013): 67.
31
Paul Kubieck, “The Commonwealth of Independent States: an Example of Failed Regionalism?”
Review of International Studies 35, no. 1 (2009): 242.
28
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respective approaches to Moscow. The respective postures of Armenia and Georgia remain
distinct with the former constructing a “cooperative” approach and the latter “defecting” from
Russia.32 The divergent paths from the original common point of an adversarial posture,
stretching from the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 to the present, constitute the basis
and chronology of this research. The factors under examination, however, have antecedents and
repercussions beyond the chronological framework that will be evaluated.
Finally, the control selection suffers from one marked deficiency. Georgia shares a
border—indeed, a violently contested border—with Russia and its unrecognized protectorates in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Armenia, though once subjected to the Kremlin, does not. This
discrepancy creates potential complications. It is an established dictum in the literature, for
example, that inter-state wars generally occur between neighbors.33 If the tendency for border
conflict was a universal reality across the post-Soviet framework then this case selection would
be rendered irrelevant. But neighborly antipathy, as previously described, is not a monolith
across the post-Soviet framework. Several border states in the near abroad, even those with
complex ethnic cleavages, remain enthusiastic partners of Russia, just as non-neighbors in the
near abroad have defected to the West and adopted antagonistic postures towards Russia. In sum,
borderland factors are obviously not the sole determiner, nor even the predominant one, in an
analysis of determining factors. The sources of border tension, furthermore, do not conform
necessarily to a model of Russian aggression. In the 2008 conflict, for example, culpability for
much of the violent escalation appears to belong to Tbilisi. Beyond that, however, the evidence is
not strong enough to support an assertive claim that Georgia deserves full responsibility for

Spetschinsky and Bolgova, “Post-Soviet or Post-Colonial.”
John A. Vasquez, “Why Do Neighbors Fight? Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality,” Journal
of Peace Research 32, no. 3 (1995): 277.
32
33
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failing to resolve the conflict-writ-large.34 In this case, the border caveat is a real input without
direct applicability to the Armenian situation. Nevertheless, the sources for escalation in the
Abkhazian crisis are still examined in the research as part of the wider narrative behind the
direction of relations.

The Dependent Variable
Over the past thirty years, Armenia and Georgia have moved gradually towards their
conflicting postures on Russia. In order to demonstrate the effect of the elected independent
variables on the status of relations with Russia, this research monitors the participation of
Armenia and Georgia in Russian-led or Western-led economic organizations, security
agreements, and other bi-lateral agreements or multilateral institutions. Participation in the
former indicates a proclivity for the “cooperation” route while involvement in the latter supports
“defection.” In short, the dependent variable for this research is the “closeness and
contentiousness of Russian relations in Georgia and Armenia—tracked by case country
engagement with Russian or Western economic and security institutions and bi-lateral
agreements.”
It is also necessary to distinguish between cause and symptom. As mentioned, the
proposed forces acting upon the status of the dependent variable are the constructed realities of
the ruling elite and the trajectory of economic dependency on Russia. In this analysis, Armenia’s
decision to form a 1993 free trade agreement with Russia captures a deliberate decision to
deepen formal economies ties, but it does not axiomatically indicate Armenia’s economic
dependence on Russia. Instead, the motivation behind the 1993 free trade agreement, illuminated
through elite discourse and formal procedures, shows that the exigencies of economic

34

Heidi Tagliavini, Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia,
IIFFMCG, Vol. II, 2009.
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dependency were the principal causes for pursuing a free-trade agreement. The agreement itself,
or attempts meanwhile, represents a deepening of institutional engagement as expressed in the
dependent variable and determined by the independent variables, and might very well reinforce
the trajectory.
The formulation of institutional engagement as the bell-weather of Russian relations
requires a nuanced analysis of the agreements. For example, participation in the Eurasian
Economic Union (EAEU) indicates a strong political and economic affiliation with Russia.
Indeed, the EAEU explicitly aims for “deep integration” between members and has been
described by many experts as a conscious geopolitical counterweight to the European Union.35 In
any comparison, membership of the EAEU would indicate a deep level of commitment to
Russian relations. By contrast—participation in the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS)—a regional commonwealth of post-Soviet states founded by Russia and likeminded
successor states, demonstrates less de facto commitment to a pro-Russian position than
participation in the EAEU or a CIS supplementary agreement, such as the Commonwealth of
Independent States Free Trade Area (CISFTA). Membership in the CIS proper is evidently less
insightful as a metric of integration and affiliation. Georgia retained membership right up until
the 2008 war and Ukraine remained a member for nearly five years after the Crimean invasion.36
These examples exemplify how membership status in the CIS was retained despite pronounced
deteriorations in bilateral relations. The post-Soviet institutional network thus forms a hierarchy
of relevance for the purposes of this analysis. By extension, indications of “defection” in the
David Tarr, “The Eurasian Economic Union of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and the Kyrgyz Republic:
Can it succeed where its predecessor failed?” Eastern European Economics 54, no.1 (2016); Nicu Popescu,
“Eurasian Union: The Real, the Imaginary and the Likely.” Chaillot Paper, no. 132 (2014); Alexander Knobel,
Andrey Lipin Andrey Malokostov, David G. Tarr, and Natalia Turdyeva, “Deep Integration in the Eurasian
Economic Union: What are the Benefits of Successful Implementation or Wider Liberalization?” Bank of Russia,
Working Paper (2019).
36
Spetschinsky and Bolgova, “Post-Soviet or Post-Colonial, 117.
35
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Caucasus region can be intuited by refusals to participate in Russian-led international
organizations as well as by overtures towards and participation in Western-aligned institutions
through agreements with NATO or the European Union. Furthermore, it must be acknowledged
that there are degrees of engagement; Armenia and Georgia, for example, both received NATO
Individual Partnership Action Plans, but expressed very different ambitions in their respective
agreements.
Certain scholars, however, have supplied relevant concerns to this selection of
institutional engagement. Their chief objections stem from the belief, reminiscent of the
‘conventional wisdom’ mentality, that many post-Soviet states were coerced into Russia’s nexus
of international institutions and agreements. Naturally, such a conclusion undermines the
serviceability of institutional engagement as a dependent variable. The objection is specifically
relevant to this research as the claim of interference extends to Armenia’s entrance into the
Eurasian Economic Union.37 Fortunately, academic analysis has begun to penetrate and push
back, and the mutualism of agreements forms an important aspect of the research.
This comparative research aims to challenge the claims made by the proponents of the
‘conventional wisdom’ by offering an alternative analysis from the perspective of the post-Soviet
states, rather than presume relations are principally determined by Russia’s behavior. For this
purpose, the research identifies two variables that appear to determine the diplomatic trajectory
of post-Soviet states in Transcaucasian.
First, the comparative degree of economic and commercial interdependence between the
post-Soviet Transcaucasian states and Russia impacts the direction of relations. It is no
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coincidence that Armenia, for example, remained highly dependent on the CIS export-import
trade throughout the 1990s and concurrently engaged with Russian-aligned economic institutions
and agreements.38 Georgia’s relations with Russia were likewise conditioned in this first period
by heavy dependence, although as will be illustrated, Georgian elites consciously began to push
against dependence and Russia on account of their own Euro-Atlantic (pro-Western) constructed
realities.
Although Georgia made overtures to Russia and initially joined the CIS, it became more
independent from post-Soviet economic systems. Another prominent example of socioeconomic
interdependence and its effects on diplomatic posturing is expressed by the relevance of
expatriate and diaspora populations. Diaspora populations, both within Russia and throughout
the world, are a frequent fixture of the post-Soviet world. The Armenian diaspora in Russia, in
particular, looms large over Yerevan’s foreign and economic policy. Despite garnering less
attention than Armenian-American expatriates, the diaspora population in Russia provides
private remittances equivalent to nearly a fifth of Armenia’s GDP, at $2 billion per year.39 In
addition, much of this “diaspora” involves a cycle of temporary migration to Russia followed by
return to Armenia. Thus, the engagement of expatriates in Russia remains relevant for the
Armenian government and Armenian political elites. Consequently, the Armenian government
has struggled since independence to “maximize diaspora economic support for the new state, and
to minimize its political involvement.”40 Georgia’s diaspora in Russia, though non-negligible, is
magnitudes smaller than the Armenian diaspora, and exercises little direct influence on
Georgia’s economic and political system. Significantly, many discrepancies in Transcaucasian
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diasporas predate independence, undercutting any accusation that the “Russia decisions” are a
simple reflection of Russian coercion.
The second feature of this research adopts a constructivist foreign policy analysis (FPA)
framework to analyze the impact of ‘constructed geo-political realities’ on the trajectory of
regional relations. The essence of this approach frames the structures and perspectives of the
international environment as socially constructed and therefore assumes that the principal actors
are subject to pre-determined norms, precepts, and identity affiliations.41 This piece uses
“constructed reality” to refer to the socially determined geopolitical viewpoints of the agents of
post-Soviet foreign policy. David Patrick Houghton uses the example of Lyndon Johnson to
demonstrate an identical concept, recalling an incident in which Lyndon Johnson rejected the
usage of nuclear weapons in North Vietnam. Though his rejection might be taken as self-evident,
it is clear that Johnson’s response was conditioned by international, cultural, and social norms
about the use of nuclear weapons and the possible consequences of such an action.42
The same strategy applied to the elite personalities of Armenian and Georgian foreign
policy reveals much about the social and cultural paradigms behind elite decisions and the
general sources and direction of foreign policy. For example, it is necessary to examine the
considerable influence of Saakashvili on Georgian foreign policy as well as the socio-cultural
imprints that shaped his international perspective. His role in the 2008 Georgian war, and the
influence of “Euro-Atlantic” discourses on his geopolitical concept of Georgia deserves attention
as a foil to claims of consistent Russian culpability and instigation.43 An identical standard of
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comparative analysis extends to Armenian leaders, such as former president Levon TerPetrosyan, and the social and cultural paradigms in Armenian foreign policy that influence policy
choices. The objectives of leaders and foreign policy elites, and the social influences operating
on the formulation of those objectives, therefore constitutes the focus of the FPA. In general, the
foreign policy paradigms of elite actors in Armenia and Georgia have pervaded political loyalties
and ensured a degree of constancy in the trajectory of relations. Leaders that have drifted outside
the accepted boundaries of elite realities have been removed, and neither elections nor
revolutions have succeeded in disrupting the direction of Russo-Transcaucasian relations. In
sum, the “median” political position with respect to Russia and Europe, irrespective of national
leadership, varies from state to state depending on the constructed realities of their chief actors.
This comparative approach intends to challenge the presumption of Russian-directed relations
and demonstrate how elite paradigms can determine the course of national foreign policy.
Finally, the two hypotheses are not independent of each other. Economic interdependence and
the development of elite constructed geo-political realities can be mutually reinforcing.

Research Strategies and Outline
As mentioned, systemic investigations of Transcaucasian and wider post-Soviet relations
in the near abroad with Russia have tended to approach the topic from the perspective of Russian
foreign policy. This project intends to amalgamate existing data and challenge the direction of
analysis in the literature with a new emphasis on near abroad state-level examinations and the
deeper sources of post-Soviet relations, such as elite identity. Individual case studies exist across
the range of the aforementioned research factors and generally serve as the basis of the research.
For example, Edmund Herzig provides a comparative and systematic analysis for the
Transcaucasian states that captures the geopolitical and economic situation at the turn of the
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millennia.44 Several case studies and academic works cover the Abkhazian and the NagornoKarabakh conflict with regard to the saliency of leadership influences in foreign policy.45 Further
projects concur on the determining impact of social and cultural paradigms on the wider
development of foreign policy both in Georgia and Armenia.46 As for expatriate populations in
the region, reviews have examined their economic importance, but data is more preliminarily
about the extent of their political clout.47 Broad post-Soviet migration data has been provided by
initiatives like the Global Commission on International Migration and country-specific studies.
Comprehensive regional economic information is broadly available in reports such as the IMF:
Selected Issues/Country Reports, World Bank country update reports, and country-specific
economic studies. Concurrently, speeches, interviews, and other media are employed to provide
insight into the thinking of domestic elites.
As illustrated in the introduction, the rest of this research is divided into three sections, a
discussion, and a conclusion. The first section provides a broad outline of Georgian and
Armenian relations with Russia and the West from independence to the present. The subsequent
section argues that shared elite visions for the state in the post-Soviet space, so-called
‘constructed realities,’ were decisive in determining national trajectories. The third section
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evaluates the impact of economic dependence and the reaction of elites to that dependence by
deepening or defecting engagement with Russia or the West. The research finishes with a
discussion of how the two variables reinforce each other and a review of the key points of
comparison before the conclusion.

Section 1: Overview of Relations with Russia and the West
Periodization
For the purposes of analysis, Armenian and Georgian foreign policy are divided into
three historical periods. The division helps highlight how the development of each state’s foreign
policy was conditioned by an elite outlook that combined a concern for the economic
dependence of the state with a geo-political constructed reality informed initially by 1) historical
experience and later by an experience of the 2) post-Soviet security situation that tended to
confirm the historical experience.
During the first period (1991-2003), elites in both countries were highly insecure given
domestic instability and national dependence on post-Soviet links. As a result, Armenia and
Georgia entertained broad diplomatic postures with Russia and the West. Superficially, both
states pursued similar international affiliations without overdone prejudice to one side. Russia
was employed for the benefit of ruling elites in Georgia and then for the benefit of Armenia’s
cause in Nagorno-Karabakh. But even during this period there were clear signs of developing
long-term postures. Post-Soviet clashes, changing economies, and conflicting supranational
visions induced Georgian elites to deleverage their security dependence and Armenian elites to
increase their own. At the same time, elite understanding of foreign policy was informed by
historical and recent experiences, reinforced by conflicts in Georgia’s secessionist territories and
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the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia’s perceived position in these conflicts among
elites would prove decisive in consolidating Transcaucasian constructed realities and the
trajectory of foreign policy.
The subsequent period (2003-2008) sharpened the previously subdued divergences
between Yerevan and Tbilisi as Georgia moved towards the decisive moment in its ‘Russia
decision.’ After the 2003 revolution, Georgian elites elevated their Euro-Atlantic outlook,
complete with anti-Russian rhetoric, into definitive policy and clamored for membership in the
Western bloc. Their fight against Russia —escalated into a failed 2008 war following
provocations by Tbilisi. This moment marked Georgia’s decisive defection away from Russia
and its post-Soviet networks. By contrast, Armenian elites, desiring to encourage FDI and retain
Russia’s protection, deepened their dependence on Russia even as they made selective overtures
to the West. Yerevan’s leadership, sinking into a Eurasian affiliation, never questioned
Moscow’s position as its indispensable partner.
The final period (2008-present) demonstrated the consolidation and durability of
Georgia’s pro-Western and Armenia’s pro-Russian trajectory. For Armenia, the trends of the
previous period were confirmed when Armenia abruptly abandoned plans for an agreement with
the European Union and instead began to integrate into the Eurasian Economic Union. In this
decision to affiliate with Russia’s post-Soviet framework, Armenian elites were as much driven
by economic considerations as by enduring insecurity over Nagorno-Karabakh. Their
constructed realities were again confirmed by war in 2016 with Azerbaijan and Russia’s
subsequent provision of heavy weaponry. Since underlying insecurities, Russia’s historical
protection, and economic integration with the Eurasian Economic Union have reinforced the
outlook of Armenian elites, the Eurasian Economic Union remains Yerevan’s focus despite
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revolution and political turmoil. Georgia, as well, has confirmed its Euro-Atlanticism in the
aftermath of its 2008 break with Russia. As in Armenia, the consolidation of Euro-Atlanticism in
Georgia’s foreign policy is not just a consequence of the war, but the entire experience of the
post-Soviet period and prevailing economic trends that strengthen elite desire for membership in
the Western framework.

Diagram 1: Summary of Periodization
Georgia
Period

Foreign Policy

Euro-Atlantic (“pro-Western”)
outreach, initially conditioned by
dependence on Russia.
Period 2 (2003-2008)
Integration efforts into EuroAtlantic structure, and anti-Russian
policy.
Period 3 (2008-present) Sustained Euro-Atlantic affiliation.
Period 1 (1991-2003)

Dependence on Russia
High, but declining security
and economic dependence.
Low security and economic
dependence.
Very low security and
economic dependence.

Armenia
Period

Foreign Policy

Dependence on Russia

Period 1 (1991-2003)

Complimentary multi-lateral
outreach, initially conditioned by
dependence on Russia.

Period 2 (2003-2008)

Eurasian (“pro-Russian”) outreach
encouraged by high dependence.

High but declining economic
dependence and sustained
security dependence (i.e. over
Nagorno-Karabakh).
High and growing economic
dependence, sustained high
security dependence.
High economic and security
dependence.

Period 3 (2008-present) Full Eurasian integration.

Georgia in Period 1
The initial attempts by the effectively independent states to construct national foreign
policies seemed to mirror the popular anti-Russian energy expressed in the nationalist referenda.
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At the time, Georgia was ruled by President Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1990-1992), a Soviet-era
dissident and the country’s premier radical nationalist. Amid the chaos of the USSR’s
disintegration, Gamsakhurdia showed himself determined to purge Georgia of Russian and
secessionist tendencies. He governed through a populist-authoritarian regime constructed upon a
mixture of Georgian chauvinism and anti-Russian rhetoric that was anything but docile. His
power collapsed in August 1991 and Georgia fell into civil war before succumbing to a
triumvirate of prominent opposition politicians, though internal conflict persisted.
The political order that succeeded Gamsakhurdia ended up in the control of the former
Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze (1992-2003), who served as the unofficial
executive before assuming the Georgian presidency in 1995. Under Shevardnadze, Georgia
began to assume the pro-Western trappings that would eventually form a definitive fixture of
Tbilisi's foreign policy. At the onset, however, such a break from Russia was impossible given
Georgia’s economic dependence on post-Soviet networks and the confused security situation.
Furthermore, the United States and the European powers had not formulated their own
diplomacy in the near abroad region, and as a result, the West tended to default to a “Russiafirst” policy.
Absent alternatives for international patronage of Georgian security, Shevardnadze
cautiously turned to Moscow to help stem the tide of domestic and external conflict that was
destabilizing Georgia. In October 1993, Shevardnadze brought Georgia into the Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS). Yeltsin’s long-term ambition was to turn the CIS into a
supranational economic union and collective security alignment that could preserve and revive
Soviet-era linkages. Shevardnadze was willing to play along if his compromise scored Georgia
assistance in the repression of rebellious Gamsakhurdian loyalists, as well as stabilized Georgia’s
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free-falling economy.48 The following year, Shevardnadze and President Yeltsin signed a
package of military treaties that legitimized the presence of three Russian bases with the express
purpose of stabilizing Georgia, protecting Russian speakers, and assisting in the build-up of the
Georgian military. It was with Russian support, weapons, and fuel that Tbilisi succeeded in its
repression of Gamsakhurdia’s militias.49 Yerevan as well would soon share in Russia’s military
beneficence. As a result of Russian support, Georgia agreed to assist with Russia’s operations
against the Chechnya separatists and accepted CIS peace-keeping forces in disputed Abkhazia,
then under a 1994 ceasefire. Significantly, the apex of Russo-Georgian relations, perceptible
around 1994-5, coincided with the apex of Georgian economic and security dependence on
Russia.
Despite the rapprochement, Moscow constituted only one pillar of Shevardnadze’s
balanced diplomacy and it was very unpopular among the populace and political elites. In fact,
Georgian elites viewed the CIS in a similar vein as the “conventional wisdom” proclaims: a
cover by the Kremlin to “colonize the near abroad.”50 When Georgia stabilized, however,
Shevardnadze pursued membership in various Western organizations. Georgia joined NATO’s
Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994 before a more concerted outreach in the late 1990s
to the IMF, the Council of Europe, and the World Bank, while slowly distancing itself from
Russia.51 New economic opportunities were also attracting heretofore uninterested Westerners in
Transcaucasia and increasing Georgian connectivity to the West, though NATO remained
reticent on Caucasian entanglement as Georgia was still of secondary importance to the West. It
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was a curious dilemma for Georgia, as Stephen Jones explained, that the “West was desirable but
not attainable, and Russia was undesirable but not alienable.”52 The pressures that determined
Georgia’s definitive split from Russia, nevertheless, were clearly pushing Tbilisi away from
Moscow.
In 1997, Georgia joined three other CIS members—Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova—
in the creation of GUAM, or what was to become the Organization for Democratic and
Economic Development (ODED). GUAM represented those states in the post-Soviet space that
were distancing themselves from Moscow and seeking to prevent the transformation of the CIS
into a more integrated supra-national union.53 The tilt away from Russia, presaged in 1997 with
GUAM on the international stage, accelerated on the ground as Shevardnadze tacitly approved a
seven-day militia war in Abkhazia in 1998 with anti-CIS overtones, and then arrived in the
spring of 1999 when Shevardnadze (along with his fellow GUAM members) refused to renew
the Collective Security Treaty. In November 1999, Georgia then succeeded in forcing Russia to
agree to close down its military bases located in Georgian territory at the OSCE Summit in
Istanbul.54 The departure of Russian border guards and the transference of ten military
installations, an arrangement first agreed upon in the depths of Georgia’s civil war, was also
attained at this summit, though some bases remained occupied.
For Georgia, the shift away from Russia was directly coinciding with a new diplomatic
and geo-political push to the West. Shevardnadze spoke, for the first time, about a plan for
Georgian membership in NATO and then followed his declarations with an institutional
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deepening; Georgia joined the Council of Europe (two years before Armenia) and the
Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP). Military assistance from NATO
was plentiful, including joint exercises, military resource management, free training, and direct
equipment. NATO members were also subsidizing agreed Georgian takeovers of Russian
military installations—procured during the nadir of Russian hard power.55
From a conceptual standpoint, Georgian elites and officials were formulating the
trajectory of their foreign policy, culminating in various national security documents and
resolutions that sought integration into the Western nexus. At the 2002 NATO Prague Summit,
Shevardnadze declared that he “strongly welcomed [the] further eastward expansion of the
Alliance” and asserted outright “that Georgia is determined to be a full member of NATO and is
resolved to work hard to prepare for this historic mission.”56 But under Shevardnadze’s
administration the complete break from Russia was decelerated and the road to NATO and the
EU unclear; there was no doubt what bloc Georgia was leaning towards but the official will did
not yet forcibly pursue the end goal.

Georgia in Period 2
Following mass outrage over evidence of electoral rigging in the 2003 election,
Shevardnadze was forced to resign by his soon-to-be successor, Mikhail Saakashvili. The
victorious elite envisioned overcoming Georgia’s residual dependence on Russia and then
committing to the West. This was very unlike Armenia, where elites had so far accepted—in
fact, deepened—dependence on Russia rather than challenge it within the context of perceived
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economic and security needs. For Georgia, the Soviet-era links were something to be supplanted,
not nurtured. These aspirations were embodied in the person and coterie of Mikhail Saakashvili,
who steered much of the so-called “Rose Revolution” and scored the presidency in noncompetitive presidential elections that followed in January 2004..57
Georgia’s “Russian decision” was looming, and it would soon defect from Russia’s
international framework. A furious drive to attract the Western bloc then followed with
Saakashvili courting the Western bloc and re-calibrating Georgia’s international commitments.
In March 2004 he gave complete access for NATO to use Georgia as a supply depot, and then in
November drastically increased Georgia’s military deployment in Afghanistan. Though the
initiative generally came from Saakashvili, he was helped by the enthusiasm of the Bush
administration in their search for a Freedom Agenda success story.58 Saakashvili and his allies
envisioned Georgia’s compliance with NATO standards by 2008, and had similar expectations
for membership in the European Union, although the latter enthusiasm soon abated.59
NATO, therefore, earned the lion’s share of Georgian attention. In 2004, Georgia signed
the first ever NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). IPAPs were designed to tailor
NATO cooperation with partner countries to specific regional circumstances. Georgia’s IPAP
opened with the explicit declaration that Georgia’s strategic objective was Euro-Atlantic
integration with full membership of NATO and integration with the European Union. No
mention of fostering amicable relations with Moscow was included; in fact Russia’s only
appearance in the document was a curt note expressing Georgia’s desire to fulfill the terms of the
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1999 Istanbul agreement, which had included Russian military withdrawal from Georgia.60
Georgia’s IPAP offered much more than previous vehicles of collaboration, such as the
Partnership for Peace or the Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process. Here was an
institutional mechanism, offered by NATO, that conspicuously declared for NATO membership
and against Russia.
Whether or not the Western bloc would permit total integration remained ambiguous. At
first, indications looked encouraging. Georgia’s IPAP was the prelude to a deeper institutional
dialogue called “Intensified Dialogue,” offered by NATO in September 2006 and commencing
in December. This process had previously been employed in Eastern Europe prior to
membership. At the same time, however, NATO officials were sending mixed signals, and
warning that the secessionist issue in South Ossetia and Abkhazia required resolution. Still, the
Georgian elite placed their hopes in a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), which failed to
materialize at the much anticipated 2008 Bucharest Summit. Instead, NATO promised
Saakashvili eventual ascension, but without an immediately accessible path. Meanwhile, at the
summit, President Putin affirmed a ‘red-line’ that rejected further NATO expansion on Russia’s
border. He explained his decision by arguing that NATO’s promises to Russia that enlargement
was “not directed against Russia” were insufficient.61 Indeed, in Georgian rhetoric the role of
NATO was as much about protection as patronage.
Saakashvili’s maneuverings in the April 2008 summit gave way to a dramatic escalation
that same summer. Saakashvili had long been escalating his confrontation with the breakaway
secessionist republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia with sanctions, proxies, and infiltration.
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Russia was responding, especially during the Kosovo controversy and the Bucharest Summit, by
threatening to recognize the former Georgian territories as independent states. The escalatory
crisis, ripe with skirmishes, sanctions, and militia violence, reached a climax in August 2008
when Saakashvili initiated military operations and the now-confident Kremlin came to the
assistance of the separatists. The 2008 war lasted only a few days, and concluded when Russian
forces forced the Georgians out from South Ossetia and Abkhazia and began pushing into
Georgian territory before a ceasefire was declared. Russia followed its victory by recognizing
Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states.62
Unsurprisingly, the 2008 war portended no rapprochement in Georgian-Russian relations.
The West looked on Georgia as the sympathetic victim of Russian aggression, and the
increasingly authoritarian Saakashvili was still firmly in control. Georgia had also succeeded in
overcoming Georgia’s dependence on Russia. Natural gas flowed into Georgia from Azerbaijan
while domestic hydroelectric power enabled Tbilisi to overcome a slate of economic sanctions
imposed by Moscow between 2005 and 2007.63 With dependence and relations on the decline,
Saakashvili finalized the “Russia decision” with Georgia’s defection from Russian-led
institutions in the near abroad. By 2009, Georgia was unprepared for further engagement in the
CIS, which had degraded from its supranational ambitions into a forum to discuss issues of “low
politics” in the near abroad.64 Even this degree of post-Soviet linkage, especially as it had been
designed by Russia, was not to be encouraged. Saakashvili withdrew from the CIS in April
2009.65
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Georgia in Period 3
Georgia’s political scene has been unstable, but its diplomatic trajectory is constant.
Under Saakashvili, Georgia continued its outreach to the West. Despite the fact that Western
enthusiasm for Georgian membership had been dampened by Tbilisi's role in the 2008 war, the
Obama Administration recognized Georgia’s interests in its 2011 National Security Concept. In
2014, NATO invited Georgia into the "Enhanced Opportunities Partners" (EOP) group that
offered enhanced cooperation with NATO facilities and the security partnership has continued to
deepen. The United States has also provided Tbilisi with over $750 million in military assistance
since the 2008 war (Mrachek, 4). To date, however, no MAP has been provided by NATO to
Georgia, even though NATO repeatedly recognizes that Georgia’s membership is inevitable.66
Saakashvili subsequently re-focused Georgia’s foreign policy, and began negotiating with the
European Union for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) through the recently
launched Eastern Partnership (EaP).67
In 2011, Georgian businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili began to organize the Georgian
opposition, chafing under divided leadership and Saakashvili’s growing tendency for
authoritarianism. His opposition, known as the Georgian Dream (GD), overcame state-backed
harassment to win the 2012 parliamentary election and take power.68 Ivanishvili himself stood
down in 2013 for backroom influence, but GD represented a wider constituency of elite opinion.
They argued for a ‘normalization’ of relations with Russia and began to prosecute Saakashvili's
ministers. But this normalization, in reality, was no reversal of the ‘Russia decision.’ GD
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resolutely affirmed the Western foreign policy even as it made noises about relaxing the standoff
with Russia. Relations with Russia were incompletely restored with the appointment of a Special
Representative for Relations with Russia.69 Economic relations and humanitarian concerns were
'officially' depoliticized in 2012.70 But even the gentle détente has been unstable, and tensions
cyclically remerge.

Armenia in Period 1:
Georgia was not alone in spending its formative years pursuing a “balanced” foreign
policy. Armenia, facing similar internal traumas and external dependencies, struck out its own
“multi-vectored” foreign policy, known as the ‘complementarity’ policy. President Levon TerPetrosyan, Armenia’s inaugural president, was the architect of this policy and its chief
practitioner until his downfall in 1998. During his administration, he built the policy around “not
uniting to any political or military block.”71 For example, Ter-Petrosyan refused to make an issue
out of the Armenian Genocide in an effort to normalize relations with Turkey (an initiative that
soon crumbled), chased cooperation with Iran, and courted Western assistance to shore up the
legitimacy of Armenia’s shaky independence.
Armenia’s overtures to the West exhibited none of the same enthusiasm shown by their
Georgian neighbors. In 1994, Armenia joined NATO’s new program, Partnership for Peace
(PfP), which called for “promoting reforms, increasing stability, and enhancing security
relationships both between and among Partner countries and NATO.”72 Armenian membership,
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however, was a reaction to Azerbaijan's earlier ascension to PfP and attributable to the belief
among Armenian elites that Baku could not be allowed to outflank Armenia in the international
arena.73 Given its intimate security and economic dependence on Russia, Armenia’s relations
with NATO were cordial, but not seriously progressing.
Under Ter-Petrosyan, however, Armenia only had found consistent disappointment in its
attempts to branch out. The basic premise of this failure was generally one of limited interest;
Armenia had few real connections with those which it pursued. For example, many elites after
independence desired more engagement with the Arab states, but such aspirations were severely
restricted by a lack of economic common interest, as well as by Armenia’s commitment to
Nagorno-Karabakh in its struggle against Azerbaijan, which was also orchestrating a blockade of
Armenia with Turkish assistance. Inside the OSCE Minsk Group, officials fretted that Armenia’s
position was weakening as constituent states grew their stakes in the Azerbaijani oil industry.
Concurrently, the United States was encouraging its own interests in Azerbaijan, and in 1996 the
State Department clarified its support for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.74 Limited cooperation
was managed with Iran, and would eventually grow, but such outreach was under constant
pressure from various sources; border skirmishes, overtures to Israel, the Nagorno-Karabakh
crisis, and Iranian skepticism towards the practicality of Armenia’s complementary foreign
policy.
Despite the sincerity of Ter-Petrosyan’s overtures, in reality Armenia was drifting back
into the Russian camp. Unlike Georgia, the “multi-vector” foreign policy of Armenia, in part due
to the conflicting geo-political views of Armenian and Georgian elites in the post-Soviet security
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situation, enabled Russia to assume a privileged role as the provisional guarantor of Armenian
security. Whereas Shevardnadze had controversially appealed to Russia in order to save his state
from anarchy, Ter-Petrosyan signed up for the CIS in December 1991 without fanfare and the
Armenian parliament approved it with ease. The next year, Armenia acceded to the CIS
Collective Security Treaty (CST) and allowed Russian access to military installations in Armenia
with an additional basing agreement approved in the summer of 1994.75 Central to this deepening
of security relations was the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, in which Armenia supported the
majority-ethnic Armenian population against the Republic of Azerbaijan and their informal allies
in Ankara. During the course of the conflict, especially in its high intensity concluding years,
Armenia was completely dependent upon Russia for economic and wartime necessities,
including a significant number of arms transfers.76 Armenian elites tended to react to this
dependency by deepening their involvement in Russia’s international framework. In 1997, TerPetrossian signed a military-security alliance with Russia. Nevertheless, he remained committed
to widening the complimentary policy, and sought compromise and conciliation wherever
possible to ‘break out’ of Armenia’s isolation.
Ter-Petrosyan was deposed in a 1998 parliamentary coup that elevated his prime
minister, Robert Kocharyan, into the presidency.77 Kocharyan, who was also the former
president of the contested Nagorno-Karabakh republic, never challenged Russia’s role as the
‘indispensable nation.’ Instead, during Kocharyan’s administration, Armenia sought
developmental and symbolic engagement with the West, while concurrently deepening its
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practical integration into the post-Soviet networks maintained by Moscow. In effect, Armenia
could earnestly participate in the Council of Europe (2001), the PfP Planning and Review
Process (2002) or the EU’s European Neighborhood Policy (2004) without threatening its
Russian pillar. As American policy came under review after September 11, Armenia was offered
many more opportunities to engage with and receive support from the West’s security
framework. Yerevan managed these opportunities to maximize assistance and military
cooperation without irritating Russia; the results were very restrained. Compared to Georgia,
Armenia’s investment in Western outreach was considerably more muted when compared to
Georgia’s commitment. For example, Kocharyan sent 50 men under Polish command to Iraq in
contrast to Georgia’s 850-strong expeditionary force.78 The training programs that were
prioritized by Armenian elites with NATO, furthermore, were underfunded, a concern later
expressed by Defense Minister Tevzadze.79
Armenian officials who orchestrated Yerevan’s participation in Western programs that
elicited military training and assistance, economic aid, and humanitarian support succeeded in
avoiding Moscow’s ire by re-affirming Yerevan’s official alignment with Russia. Kocharyan
himself asserted that Armenia could have no place within NATO, thereby limiting Armenia’s
participation in NATO to collaborative, not integrative, activities. In December 2002, the
Armenian parliament evinced that reality when it approved equity-for-debt swaps that transferred
control of five Armenian defense enterprises to Russian proprietorship in exchange for $95
million in debt relief.80 That same year, Armenia and Russia agreed to further military
collaboration. Russian officials, including then-foreign minister Igor Ivano, could openly call
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Armenia "Russia's only ally in the south."81 The face of the complimentary policy was becoming
less believable.

Armenia in Period 2:
Under Kocharyan and his ruling party, the Republican Party of Armenia (RPA),
Armenian foreign policy more clearly evinced a fundamental dependence on the “Russia first.”
Negotiations with the European Union were deemed a pressing matter, but that approach
remained cautious. Armenia’s 2006 non-binding Action Plan aimed for linking reform with an
ambiguous “stake in the EU’s Internal Market” and gradual involvement in “EU policies and
programs.” 82 Progress was slow and contentious.
Negotiations with the EU were prioritized but it was by no means the only outreach. For
example, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) accepted Armenia’s IPAP in 2005, but in contrast to
Georgia, Armenia’s IPAP was strictly delimited in its ambition.83 President Kocharyan and his
2008 successor, Serzh Sargsyan, frequented the viewpoint that joining NATO “would barely
improve the country’s security, and [it would] affect its relations with neighboring countries.”84
These statements competed with IPAPs that envisioned “European integration” as had been
promised to Georgia.85 But the direction of policy seemed to back up Kocharyan and Sargsyan.
Armenian-Russian security collaboration intensified with a flurry of military agreements. Within
the CIS and CSTO, Armenia actively supported the supranational framework. It held the rotating
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chairmanship of the CSTO from 2007 to 2008 and assigned a full unit to the Collective Rapid
Reaction Force (CRRF) in 2009.86 Perhaps most decisively, Armenia’s economic dependence on
Russia dramatically increased during this period, partially as a result of pre-existing conditions as
well as deliberate encouragement of Russian investment and ownership of strategic industries.

Armenia in Period 3:
In September 2013, Sargsyan announced plans to abandon negotiations for an
Association Agreement (AA) and committed instead to the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU) with
Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. European officials believed the defection was principally
driven by security concerns, not economic motivations.87 This was only half-true. In reality,
Armenia’s economic configuration invited further integration with Russia. Furthermore, Russia
had deftly provoked the concerns of Armenian elites on Nagorno Karabakh, and they were
destined to default onto their conventional strategy of strengthening ties with Russia. Their
reservations were not without economic cause. NATO and EU member states had mostly
prohibited selling offensive weapons to Armenia through an OSCE embargo.88 As always,
Armenian elites saw Russia as the only source of stability. Armenia’s “U-turn” will be explained
in further detail in subsequent sections.
Membership in the ECU implied a statement of bloc affiliation as definitive as Georgia’s
guarantees from NATO or agreements with the EU. The common economic space evolved into
the supranational Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which was to facilitate “deep integration”
towards a single market behind a common external tariff. Sargsyan’s decision sent a clear signal
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on Armenia’s Russia decision; wider integration and cooperation with Russia was Yerevan’s
practical destiny. Armenia’s economic configuration and the security concerns of foreign policy
actors had consistently pointed to Russia; the decision to break from the AA process and join the
EAEU resolved the multi-vectored policy conclusively in Moscow’s favor.
Armenia’s security did not improve in the immediate aftermath of EAEU membership.
Tensions with Azerbaijan along the contested border continued to escalate, and Azerbaijan was
still receiving arms deliveries from a 2010 agreement with Russia. Putin, however, did provide
Armenia with a 2015 emergency loan to acquire modern weaponry before a short and
inconclusive four-day war erupted with Azerbaijan in April 2016.89 In response, Moscow sent
huge weapon supplies to Armenia after the war. Russia was keen not to appear as an unreliable
ally within the EAEU and the CSTO.90 Despite controversy within Armenia, the Eurasian Union
has proved a durable cornerstone of Armenia’s ‘Russia decision.’ In April and May 2018,
protesters ousted the incumbent government in the ‘Velvet Revolution’ and brought the EAEUskeptic, Nikol Pashinyan, into the premiership. In no time, however, Armenia resumed its normal
posture in the EAEU.
Given its comprehensive commitment to the EAEU, Armenia was unhappily permitted
by Russia and the EAEU to continue negotiating limited agreements with the European Union.
The EU still constitutes a sizable, if diminishing, portion of Armenia’s trade. The sustained
economic relationship culminated with the 2017 Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership
Agreement, agreed under the more Russophilic Sargsyan administration. To appease vocal
Russian opposition, negotiators removed anything that might contradict EAEU terms. In fact, the
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agreement was consciously framed as a bridge between the EU and the EAEU.91 With Yerevan
committing, rather than defecting, from the EAEU, Armenia has clearly made its Russia decision
for the foreseeable future.

Section 2: Constructed Realities
Theoretical Framework
Small States and Weak States
For much of the post-Soviet period, Armenia and Georgia were characterized as small
and weak states. Small states are defined based on specific criteria ranging from geographic size
to military strength. Small states are generally dependent upon the military power of stronger
countries and the security framework more powerful states offer to smaller ones.92 Weak states
or “fragile states” require a more rigorous definition. The World Bank describes a fragile state as
characterized “by poor governance, internal conflicts or tenuous post-conflict transitions, weak
security, fractured societal relations, corruption, breakdowns in the rule of law, and insufficient
mechanisms for generating legitimate power and authority.”93 In the international system, weak
states tend to have small economies, high dependence, little military power, and less interest in
the wider affairs.94 As newly secessionist states, Armenia and Georgia have been characterized
as weak states.95 Georgia’s weakness was also varyingly ascribed to the conflict between
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nationalists and separatists, Tbilisi's failure to meet democratic transition goals, and Russian
meddling.96 Today that appellation is less applicable to both states.

Small States, Weak States, and Patronage
Small states have several options within the international system. They may forswear
affiliation and remain outside of formal alliances. Another option is to attempt to align with a
strategic alliance or bloc. In neo-realist realist terms, the small state alignment is indicative of
balancing (allying with one side to balance and danger of another) or bandwagoning (allying
with the source of danger). Realists have historically argued that the balance of power was the
determining factor. Stephen Walt’s alternative, by contrast, stresses the ‘balance of threat’ to
small states rather than the global balance of power.97 An exclusive use of this framework,
however, obscures key determiners in the construction of an alliance, such as shared cultural or
historical affiliation.98
Constant across all these frameworks is the search for patronage. Small states develop
their foreign policy orientation in order to induce its prospective larger partner to support the
small state. They may employ various strategies—symbolic, strategic, propagandistic—in
framing membership to court their alliance. In certain examples, small states conduct ‘political
penetration’ whereby they lobby foreign governments for favor. Small states may also leave
former alliances and seek patronage and protection from a new source.99

Stacy Closson, “State Weakness in Perspective: Strong Politico-Economic Networks in Georgia's Energy Sector,”
Europe-Asia Studies 61, no. 5 (2009): 760-1.
97
Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987) 17-33.
98
Coene, Euro-Atlantic Discourse in Georgia, 15.
99
Ibid.
96

41

Weak states have their own set of options. In addition to political penetration, they may
project harmlessness, promote an inviting national image (i.e. defender of democracy), or invite
the armed forces of a great power as a form of deterrence or entrapment.

Constructivism and Actors
Constructivism in international relations can be understood broadly as an analytical lens
that incorporates actors overlooked in traditional realism and neo-liberal international relations.
While the primacy of states within the international system is still recognized, unlike realism,
constructivists consider state agency as conditioned by other actors, including political elites and
civil society. Constructivists also challenge the rational actor model employed by neo-liberals
and realists and prefer to view states as composites of their actors or social actors themselves.100
As for foreign policy elites, constructivists view their ‘rational’ outlook as conditioned by
internal argumentation and socio-cultural determiners.101 Current literature on the construction of
foreign policy indicates that outsized influence on national diplomacy is afforded to individual
leaders in small and fragile states.102 As a result, existing literature on the South Caucasus tends
to emphasize the monopolization of foreign policy by the leadership and elite personalities.103

Constructed Realities
Over the last twenty years, scholars of the South Caucasus have focused increasingly on
the instrumental role played by cultural determiners and national identity in foreign policy. Since
the Soviet center had monopolized foreign policy, post-Soviet states had little, if any, experience
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with developing a national strategy. As a result, elites in the near abroad had to establish national
interests and assign value to those interests. Ilya Prizel argues that in the post-Soviet space
political discourse around national identity—a social construction inherited or developed by
elites—served as a “reference pool” for framing national interests and conducting foreign
policy.104 Contrary to realist interpretations, national strategy was not determined by evaluations
of the balance of power, but by elite decisions based on national identity, which allowed for a
post-independence redefinition of the nation’s cultural affiliation, ‘appropriate’ borders, and
traditional patrons and enemies. In this sense, elites in the near abroad had to construct the
reality: what their state would look like (i.e. in territorial terms) and who it would associate with
(i.e. in supranational/developmental terms) by drawing on their own understanding of their preindependence past as well as their unfolding experiences in the post-Soviet period. This is the
basis of the constructed reality—it is a shared elite vision of the identity of the state within the
post-Soviet space as informed by the national identity.
In Armenia and Georgia, constructed realities have restricted the flexibility of national
strategy by placing an identity-related value on foreign policy objectives. For example, the elite
constructed realities in both countries offer no chance of conciliation over either Abkhazia/South
Ossetia or Nagorno-Karabakh—those who attempt concessions run the risk of widespread
political alienation—thereby respectively reinforcing the Soviet-era suspicions of Georgian elites
vis-a-vis Moscow and Armenia’s historical dependence on Russia. As a result, elites prejudice
policy and discourse towards one bloc and away from another in order to attain that vision. Over
time, events on the ground can reinforce the constructed reality, such as when the projected ally
fulfills its duty, or the projected enemy disturbs the peace. By reviewing the motivations behind
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the leadership and the effect of those motivations on institutional engagement and outreach, this
section contends that constructed realities have been decisive variables in determining Georgia’s
defection and Armenia’s cooperation with Russia.

Section 2A: Georgia and the Euro-Atlantic Constructed Reality
Georgia: Euro-Atlanticism
In 2004, President Saakashvili declared his pride in Georgia for “giving me an
overwhelming mandate to return Georgia to its rightful destiny as a responsible member of the
European community.”105 Saakashvili’s phrase connected a statement of identity—Georgia’s
Europeanness—with a foreign policy trajectory aimed at ‘returning’ Georgia to Europe.
Georgia’s obsession with the West is a thoroughly modern creation. Georgian
intellectuals in the late 19th century introduced European ideas during the reformist reign of Tsar
Alexander II and then transmitted a European identity onto Georgia’s valorized past. In
particular, the work of the early 20th century intellectual tsiperkhasnteslni group was
instrumental in combining Georgia’s historical experience with an idealization of the abstract
West. Elite-driven discourse constructed a Georgian who was a "Christian, European, and a
warrior-martyr” against the Muslim ‘other,’ which is a theme that has been confirmed by an
official post-independence push away from Soviet-era triumphalism and towards a semimythologized narrative around Georgia’s medieval history.106 Growing intellectual and elite
fascination with the West, generally for nationalist ends, presaged rising European involvement
in the region, particularly during the First World War. When the Bolsheviks invaded at the
height of the Russian Civil War, the Georgian elite appealed to the Allies for assistance, but
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earned no support. Despite the West’s inability to provide practical assistance, however, elites
and intellectuals remained attached to Western ideas and drove a European identity into the
Georgian mainstream throughout the 20th century.107 The emerging affinity with the West was
reinforced by the relative stagnation of Georgian economic and political life under the Soviet
Union. Rejecting communism became inseparably linked with Georgian self-identification as
European.108 During the 1970s and 1980s, as Soviet control loosened, the pro-Western image
was confirmed, and anti-Soviet nationalist leaders made appeals for NATO membership long
before the 2008 Bucharest Summit.109 Post-Soviet elites were the inheritors of this intellectual
legacy. Western identity was further strengthened by the developmental appeal of the first world
and the effect of this is apparent by the radical influence of Western neoliberalism within
Georgian domestic policy.110
The underside of elite self-identification with Europe is anti-Russianism. In the Georgian
political imagination, Russia has abused its position as natural patron in historical and postSoviet contexts. The intellectual mainstream mixes harsh condemnations of 19th century Russian
territorial imperialism in Georgia with the sobering existence of living under the Soviet regime.
Indeed, Georgia enjoyed a consistent reputation as one of the most nationalistic Soviet republics,
especially in the post-Stalin period when pro-independence demonstrations were regularly
suppressed.111 Another decisive component has been the integration of anti-Russianism into the
discourse of Georgian ethno-nationalism, generally over the question of the secessionist states,
South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
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Political elites in Tbilisi have a reliable history of defending an uncompromising, even
chauvinistic, view of territorial integrity. During the brief independent republic of Georgia, the
governing effectively Mensheviks orchestrated the annexation of Abkhazia into Georgia and
justified it on medieval claims, while a South Ossetiatian uprising in 1918 against the Menshevik
government earned a brutal repression by the Georgian central government.112 Even after the
Soviet victory in the civil war, Georgians succeeded in reducing Abkhazia and South Ossetia to
autonomous republics within the Georgian SSR by the 1930s.113 In both states, Tbilisi's Georgian
discriminatory ethno-nationalist policies stirred tension with local populations who prized their
cultural identities. Even when formal discriminatory policies were abolished, informal
discrimination persisted. Georgian elites were also wary of a Kremlin that had already tried to
subvert their territorial integrity by experimenting with formal Abkhazia and South Ossetiatian
autonomy. Gorbachev’s glasnost enabled competing nationalist expressions as anti-secession and
secessionism quarreled in the public square until both conflicts escalated into open warfare when
Tbilisi tried (and failed) to suppress militarily the defiant local governments in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia.114 At least in South Ossetia, Georgian elites, in particular Gamsakhurdia,
suspected Russian assistance was the decisive element in Georgia’s defeat and withdrawal.
Events had added another unresolved grievance towards Russia and projected it into the role of
partitioner. Saakashvili, for example, accused Russia before the 2008 war of trying to turn
Georgia into Cyprus, permanently divided.115 Tbilisi's commitment to re-unification has retained
its potency; Georgian elites even escalated disputes with Abkhazia and South Ossetia into open
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warfare on two further occasions in 1998 and 2008, the latter with Russia as the principal
adversary and the West as the rhetorical and material patron.
The inseparability of each of these threads—Western identity, anti-Russianism, and
ethno-nationalism—gives cause to analyzing the elite outlook as a coherent and interconnected
whole. Each element of this constructed reality is related to another in the discourse—the dream
of restoring an integral Georgian nation, Russia’s alleged support for Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, Georgia’s default Western identity and the subsequent appeal for Euro-Atlantic
protection and integration. An examination of Georgian national security concept documents—
before 2004 there was no official national security concept, though many documents were
produced with an overarching vision for foreign policy—evinces how each of these elements
were considered inseparable. In the 2000 document, Georgia and the World: A Vision and
Strategy for the Future, the foreign policy goals of Georgia for independence and territorial
integrity (officially ‘national unity) are placed against a backdrop of historical recriminations
against Russia and praise for Western Europe, an express desire to “reconcile the people and
leaders of Abkhazia, Georgia and the South Ossetia regions to life within the Georgian state,”
and a long-term goal to integrate into the "major institutions of the European and Euro-Atlantic
communities."116 Subsequent national security concepts produced by the Georgian government
and ratified by the parliament, as a result of the Rose Revolution, confirm in stronger terms the
coherence of Euro-Atlanticism by declaring the necessity of responding to “military aggression
by the Russian Federation...the occupation of Georgian territories” by deepening Georgia’s
already extant membership in the “Euro-Atlantic space.”117 For the Georgian elites, the
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formulation of foreign policy therefore resolves around an integrated doctrine of Georgian
territorial integrity, European identity, and anti-Russianism.
To varying degrees, every post-Soviet Georgian leader and administration has
sympathized with the Euro-Atlantic constructed reality. In this sense, Euro-Atlanticism has
existed in gradations depending on the administration and the regional situation, but the
“median” or fundamental premise of the Euro-Atlantic constructed reality has remained stable:
the consummate vision behind Georgia’s Euro-Atlanticism constructed reality imagines a
Western-affiliated Georgia, protected by the Euro-Atlantic alliance structure from a neoimperialist Russia that seeks to undermine the territorial integrity of Georgia. The durability of
this viewpoint, despite domestic political turnover, is among the most persuasive arguments that
post-independence Russo-Georgian relations have not been exclusively determined by Russian
aggression. This is particularly apparent given how instrumental Euro-Atlanticism has been in
initiating policies that contribute to a ‘defection.’

Euro-Atlanticism in the Political Leadership
The first independent Georgian administration under Gamsakhurdia represented a radical
manifestation of the Euro-Atlantic constructed reality. Although Georgia was still heavily
dependent on post-Soviet linkages and the political situation was entirely unsuitable for outright
defection, Gamsakhurdia appealed to the West to rescue Georgia, and sought through military
force the attainment of Georgia’s territorial integrity. He also openly contemplated NATO
membership as a measure that would ensure Georgian unity and protect against Russia.118 His
refusal to join the CIS naturally followed from his Euro-Atlantic position; Gamsakhurdia did all
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he could to emphasize Georgian independence in opposition to Moscow. Russian observers were
keen to emphasize this point when Gamsakhurdia reversed his position upon losing control of his
country in December 1991, ridiculing Gamsakhurdia’s attachment to the "beloved West."119
It was Shevardnadze, who succeeded Gamsakhurdia, in fact, who completed the process
of joining the CIS in 1993 (then the Collective Security Treaty) and walked back NATO
membership. But this concession did not entail an abdication of Euro-Atlanticism. In fact, his
pragmatic position was conditioned by two factors. The first was the dire need to establish
stability in Georgia, and even that was insufficient for Shevardnadze to be persuaded into
ascension until nearly a year of civil war had passed. Second, Shevardnadze pushed firm EuroAtlantic measures within the CIS and exposed the conditionality of Georgia’s membership. He
warned that the CIS would disintegrate if Russia did not adopt a Western course conducive to the
"development of democracy" and insisted that the organization had to oppose "aggressive
separatism" and uphold the "territorial integrity of the CIS states" in a clear jab at Russia’s
involvement in Abkhazia.120 Though Shevardnadze’s Euro-Atlanticism was on full display, his
pragmatism ensured that relations with Russia were cordial, and he secured a basing agreement
in 1995 to consolidate Georgia’s precarious security. But even this was a step too far for many
Georgian elites, who were furious over Russia’s treatment of the secessionist issue, and they
made clear their dissatisfaction with this break in the Euro-Atlantic constructed reality when they
refused to ratify the basing agreements.121 Once stabilization had been achieved, however,
Shevardnadze returned to the Euro-Atlantic push, and he began to deepen Georgia’s institutional
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engagement with the West. He had engaged preliminarily Georgia with Western institutions by
his 1994 decision to enlist Tbilisi in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program.122 He hinted that
Georgia “might knock on NATO’s doors,” and then, in quick succession, formed the antiRussian GUAM and refused to renew the Collective Security Treaty. Behind these decisions was
a consolidation of the Euro-Atlantic reality; a recognition that Russia, in the Georgian
imagination, could offer little but headaches on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He elucidated this
motivation when he made an open invitation in Washington for the “Euro-Atlantic Community,
already rich in experience, to invigorate the joint effort to achieve a settlement in this conflict
[Abkhazia].”123 Already Shevardnadze had managed to replace Russia with the United States as
Tbilisi's principal military-financial benefactor.124 By the end of his administration,
Shevardnadze’s Euro-Atlanticism was so perceptible that he declared the West and, in particular,
the European Union, as the “ultimate harbor” for Georgia.125 He backed this up in policy at the
2002 NATO summit when he made an official bid for full membership.
Despite the fact that by the end of his administration, Shevardnadze had revived
Georgia’s push for NATO membership and distanced from Russia, the actual process of
integration had stalled under Shevardnadze’s hybrid-authoritarianism. The so-called ‘young
reformer’ faction of Shevardnadze’s Citizens Union of Georgia (CUG), one of the strongest in
the legislature, felt that Shevardnadze’s Euro-Atlantic push was insufficient. They desired a
firmer break with the Russian past, floating the idea that Georgia’s destiny—informed by the
tsiperkhasnteslni—was to reject Eurasian influences and ‘return’ to the Western sphere.126
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Indeed, the rapid change in political leadership that followed the 2003 Rose Revolution did not
elevate an opposition with conciliatory views towards Russia.127 Instead, the ‘new reformers, led
by Saakashvili (who had quit as Minister of Justice in 2001 over corruption accusations against
Shevardnadze) and his opposition United National Movement (UNM) party, proved far more
zealous in their Euro-Atlanticism. They would, in time, confirm Georgia’s conclusive “Russia
decision” by their cavalier policy towards the secessionist states and NATO.
Zurab Zhvania, Saakashvili’s first prime minister, famously echoed the new course when
he declared “I am Georgian, and therefore I am European.”128 Saakashvili employed symbolic
tactics to exemplify this identification, such as displaying a European flag at his inauguration,
and then reiterating that Georgia’s direction was decidedly “towards European integration” and
that this direction was providentially arranged for Georgia to “take its own place in European
family, in European civilization, the place lost long ago.”129 Concurrently, Saakashvili fixed the
issue of territorial integrity at the forefront of his Euro-Atlantic agenda, going so far as to assert
that “Georgia’s territorial integrity is the goal of my life.”130 His millenarian, almost
monomaniac, conviction in the Euro-Atlantic vision—Georgia as united, independent, and
Western—left an enduring impact on his political program. He committed to recovering
Abkhazia by 2008 and redoubled the push for NATO and EU membership. Frederick Coen notes
that Saakashvili wildly proposed integrating almost all public functions into the Euro-Atlantic
community, including the judicial system, the foreign ministry, immigration desks, national
railways, and many other services.131 His pro-Western rhetoric earned Georgia a nomination for
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NATO membership from John McCain and Hilary Clinton as well as a NATO liaison officer to
expedite integration. Saakashvili enjoyed domestic extensive support for his program, and an
unofficial referendum in January 2008 showed 77 percent of voters in favor of NATO
membership.132 At the same time, given the renewed threat to their sovereignty, the secessionist
states understandably defaulted back onto Russian protection.133 It was no surprise then that
Saakashvili accused Russia during negotiations of annexing Georgian territory “behind these
[Russian] peacekeeping troops.” The non-negotiability of Georgia’s claim to the secessionist
states—the ‘red-line’ of Georgia’s constructed reality—all but guaranteed that Saakashvili would
accelerate Georgia’s turn to the Western alliance structure and irritate a Kremlin averse to further
NATO expansion on the Russia border. Indeed, Saakashvili had done little to promote
reconciliation; he pushed forces into contested territories, escalated tensions with Putin, renamed
the Minister for Conflict Resolution as Minister of Reunification, and lobbied hard for a clear
path to NATO membership.134 Once Saakashvili procured a commitment for eventual
membership at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, Georgia’s Russia decision neared completion. The
outbreak of war in 2008, largely a product of these initiatives from Georgia, simply confirmed
the decision; in institutional terms it was validated when Saakashvili, following Tbilisi’s military
defeat, defected from the CIS, or as Saakashvili appropriately called it: “some kind of postSoviet kind of thing.”135
Euro-Atlanticism, as illustrated, was decisive in determining Georgia’s Russia decision.
It was the vigorous ideology of the elite and was persistently employed in rationalizing
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decisions. Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili had captured this logic when she declared before
the initiative of NATO’s “Intensified Dialogue” that “Georgia is on a point of no return towards
NATO; Euro-Atlantic aspirations are not part of the political game; this is a political belief of the
Georgian people.”136 Each stage of integration with NATO and de-integration with Russia
flowed in Saakashvili’s administration from this fundamental belief.
Although Saakashvili’s administration was punctuated by extreme enmity and violence
with Russia, the Euro-Atlantic outlook was irrevocably reinforced by the 2008 war. Domestic
political changes after Saakashvili have failed to upend Euro-Atlanticism within the Georgian
elite. When the opposition Georgian Dream (GD) defeated the UNM in 2012 elections, Bidzina
Ivanishvili and his anti-Saakashvili allies assumed power on a presumed platform of conciliation
with Russia.137 Nevertheless, the Euro-Atlantic direction has remained remarkably stable, and the
Georgian Dream has never violated the ‘red-line’ on the secessionist territories. Maia Panjikidze,
GD’s inaugural foreign minister, clarified that Georgia would never accede to Russia’s
precondition for normalization of relations: recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. Instead, she accused the Kremlin of “occupying 20% of Georgia’s territories; Russia is
an occupying country; it has two embassies, one in Tskhinvali and another one in Sokhumi, and
as long as it remains so, diplomatic relations with Russia will not be restored.”138
De-linkage eventually allowed relations to normalize, but the fundamental controversy
cannot be resolved as long as territorial unification is sacrosanct in the elite constructed reality.
Mariam Naskidashvili and Levan Kakhishvili conducted interviews in 2017 with Georgian
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political elites on both sides of the legislature to evaluate their “national identity” and its impact
on foreign policy. The opposition, in general, expresses views in line with firm EuroAtlanticism; one MP noted that “Russia, in principle, denies Georgia’s right to be an independent
and sovereign country.” Georgian Dream, though more conciliatory than the opposition on
Russia, nevertheless agrees that acute threats emanate from Russia and that Georgia should
continue towards full Euro-Atlantic integration.139 The confirmation of the Euro-Atlantic
trajectory has been impressed clearly on Georgian Dream; Irakli Garibashvili, Ivanishvili’s
successor and a key negotiator in the Georgia-EU Association Agreement (including the
DCFTA), recycled Saakashvili’s and Bezhuashvili’s Euro-Atlantic determinism when he
proclaimed: “[the signature of the agreement] is a new great date in the chronicles of the
homeland...that is Europe, its political, economic, social, and cultural environment, from which
our country was artificially alienated for centuries…Georgia does not view Europe only as a
political choice. We have shared common values and worldviews with Europe for centuries, and
this is exactly what we value most. This is exactly why Georgia has always considered itself part
of European civilization.”140 Clearly, the ‘median’ constructed reality—Western-affiliated
Georgia, protected by the Euro-Atlantic alliance structure from a neo-imperialist Russia that
seeks to undermine the territorial integrity of Georgia—remains central to Georgia’s elite
psychology. The window for reconciliation, especially after the 2008 war, has ceased to be a
possibility within the elite political spectrum, thereby confirming Georgia’s “Russia decision.”

Section 2B: Armenia and the Complementary-Eurasian Constructed Reality
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Armenia: Complementary-Eurasianism
Unlike their Georgian counterparts, Armenian elites have strained to maintain amicable
relations with the West and Russia. This is in no small part a result of Armenia’s historical and
geographic position. While Armenian elites communicate a desire to belong to the Euro-Atlantic
community, and even consider themselves ‘European,’ the European preference has taken a
secondary position in the development of Armenia’s constructed reality.141 This might not have
been the case had Armenian elites avoided framing their national narrative and postindependence identity around Nagorno-Karabakh. Just as reunification with the secessionist
territories in Georgia forms a central component of both elite Georgian political identity and
influences Tbilisi's attitude towards Russia, so too has Nagorno-Karabakh loomed large in
Armenian national priorities and determined the intimacy of Armenian-Russian relations.
For the Armenian populace, the controversy over Nagorno-Karabakh is a highly charged
political and security dilemma. Armenians cite antiquity in their claims to ownership of
Nagorno-Karabakh and regard its majority Armenian population as tenacious defenders of their
homeland. The attachment to Nagorno-Karabakh was only enhanced following the Armenian
Genocide and the loss of Western Armenia after World War I. After the Bolshevik invasion, the
Caucasian Bureau of the Communist Party, despite the preponderance of ethnic Armenians in the
region, decided to make Nagorno-Karabakh a constituent part of the Azerbaijan SSR.142 Moscow
also refused to compromise on Nagorno-Karabakh’s status throughout the Soviet period. As a
result, nationalist demonstrations for reunification with Armenia only materialized during
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perestroika and sparked a massive popular mobilization for the cause, which was inflamed by an
Azeri pogrom that killed over 30 and dispossessed thousands of Armenians.143 Following a
declaration of sovereignty in August 1990, open warfare broke out in early 1991 and continued
until a Russian-mediated OSCE ceasefire in 1994, by which time Armenian and local Karabakh
forces had succeeded in occupying Nagorno-Karabakh and several surrounding republics.144 As
the Armenians had dropped their direct claim to Nagorno-Karabakh, the independent Republic of
Artsakh was declared under practical Armenian protection, but without international recognition.
Artsakh and Armenia, nevertheless, are highly integrated and even rotate political leaders.
Furthermore, political elites in Yerevan have successfully transformed the narrative around
protecting Nagorno-Karabakh into the defining component of post-independence Armenian
identity.145 As a result, national leadership has been legitimated and de-legitimated based on the
Karabakh issue, such as when Ter-Petrosyan was deposed for excessive conciliation over the
issue and was replaced with Kocharyan, Artsakh’s former president.
The intransigent elite commitment to Nagorno-Karabakh, however, has also induced a
permanent security crisis with historic rivals in Turkey and Azerbaijan. The conflict has featured
two wars against Baku (1992-4 and 2016) and a damaging joint economic blockade that remains
in force today. Ankara has made it clear that normalization is conditioned on Armenia
renouncing its “aggressive policy” against Baku.146 These quarrels have reinforced pre-existing
Armenian views on Turkey and Azerbaijan—already prejudiced to hostility on account of the
Armenian Genocide, the loss of western Armenia, and the Soviet-era Azeri appropriation of
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Nagorno-Karabakh—and confirmed their position as the “other” and “natural enemy” in the
post-Soviet Armenian imagination. For example, official narratives have reconstructed the 19924 war to indict Baku as the aggressor. President Kocharyan in 2011 declared that the conflict had
been “unleashed by Azerbaijani authorities seeking to conquer the territory of NagornoKarabakh through ethnic cleansing.”147 He perfectly captured the “othering” of Azeris when he
remarked that the pre-independence pr ograms had shown that “Armenians and Azerbaijanis are
ethnically incompatible.”148 As for Turkey, despite repeated peace negotiations, Ankara has
generally proved less flexible on diplomatic normalization than Yerevan. The perception of
Turkish intransigence has reified anti-Turkish sentiment in the national security discourse.
Kocharyan’s successor, Sargsyan, combined historical antipathy towards Turkey with vocal
opposition towards their post-Soviet approach to regional politics. In a speech to the Greek
Cypriot legislature, Sargsyan accused Ankara of pursuing a policy of “New Ottomanism,” and
asked: “What did the Ottoman Empire bring to the peoples under its yoke other than massacres,
oppression, and tyranny? Does anyone miss Ottomanism, providing a reason to deliver a “New
Ottomanism?”149 Furthermore, even when political leaders have upheld an international
negotiation process and encouraged reconciliation, Armenian elites have domestically defaulted
to maximalist positions on Nagorno-Karabakh and ethno-national rhetoric vis-a-vis their ‘historic
enemy.’
The natural reaction of Armenian elites, perhaps the only available option given elite and
popular commitment to the independence of Artsakh and Turkey’s membership in NATO, has
been to identify with Armenia’s traditional protector, Russia. Yerevan’s preference for Russia,
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just like the enmity towards Azeris and Turks, reflects experiences that predate independence as
well as post-independence experiences that confirmed the preference. In the 19th century, major
figures in the Armenian liberation movement prioritized reliance on Russia against the Ottoman
Empire, which governed the western Armenian provinces. The contrast between the infidel
‘other’ of Turkey and Christian Russia prejudiced Armenians to view their northern neighbor
with goodwill and appreciation. For example, during World War I and the Armenian Genocide,
Russia supported Armenians in their famous 1915 defense of Van against Ottoman troops and
Russian troops received a rapturous reception when Armenian troops advanced into Western
Armenia in 1916.150 Even during Soviet rule, when Moscow encouraged constituent nationalities
to define and clarify their identities, Armenian diaspora and domestic elites continued to frame
their identity in opposition to Turkey. This confirmed Russia’s enduring role as benevolent
protector. Consequently, dissident and official nationalism retained an unusual loyalty to the
Soviet Union in spite of the deprivation of Nagorno-Karabakh.151
As discussed, when Armenian elites began to construct their vision onto the post-Soviet
reality, they placed the recovery of Nagorno-Karabakh at the center of their identity. The sudden
Armenian antipathy towards the Soviet Union expressed in the 1991 referendum was the result
of Gorbachev’s decision to occupy Karabakh in March 1988. Charged with establishing law and
order, Soviet troops showed a clear proclivity for the Azeri position, even assisting with
deportations of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh when Armenian nationalists assumed office
in August 1990.152 The anti-Soviet mood prevailed until the 1991 putsch with the collapse of the
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Soviet Union and the emergence of a Russia that feared a NATO-aligned Turkey would project
their power into the Caucasus.153 The deteriorating situation, especially the 1993 blockade,
induced Yerevan to default back onto Russia’s security umbrella. Moscow’s consistent provision
of military equipment, security guarantees, and official support to Armenia reinforced Russia’s
position as the indispensable partner.
The geo-political reality of Russian amity and Azeri-Turkish enmity that succeeded elite
prioritization of Nagorno-Karabakh has been constant since independence. Armenia’s National
Security Strategy (NSS) emphasizes the sustained “threat to national security” posed by the
“aggressive policy of militant posturing” by the Republic of Azerbaijan and their “strategic
partner” in Turkey.154 Armenian elites have therefore elevated a ‘Russia-first’ or ‘Eurasian’
affiliation above their cultural affinity for Euro-Atlantic integration. The NSS also evinces how
Armenia’s engagement with Euro-Atlantic structures is subordinated to Russia. The document
valorizes the Russian relations for its “importance for the security of Armenia, the traditional
friendly links between the two nations, the level of trade and economic relations, Russia's role in
the Nagorno Karabakh mediation effort, as well as the presence of a significant Armenian
community in Russia, all contribute to a strategic partnership.” In contrast to Georgia—always
vociferous in calling for Euro-Atlantic integration—Armenia has avoided committing to future
assimilation in Western institutions, and instead encourages “close relations” with Euro-Atlantic
structures like the EU. Armenian elites never constructed their post-independence national
identity around an integrated Euro-Atlantic vision (i.e. the Western-affiliated and unified
Georgia), prioritizing instead Nagorno-Karabakh. As a result, all political parties in Armenia
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concur that Yerevan has no ‘Eastern’ or ‘Western’ identity to direct foreign policy, and instead
default to a ‘complimentary’ policy of officially accommodating the major blocs.155
Nevertheless, the privileged role afforded to Russia by Armenian elites has induced a
clear proclivity for Eurasian affiliation, such as the 2013 decision to drop negotiations for an EU
Association Agreement and instead opt for a place within the Eurasian Economic Union. Elites
have generally consented to this affiliation, and even the main opposition party at the time
acquiesced to Eurasian membership given the current geopolitical situation and security
challenges.156 In effect, the acquiescence demonstrates how the Armenian constructed reality,
especially its insistence on a favorable resolution on Nagorno-Karabakh, has forced a level of
dependence on Russia. The ‘median’ shared constructed reality for the post-independence period
can therefore be summarized as a Russian-affiliated Armenia, protected by Russia and its
security structures from a Turkish-Azerbaijan axis desirous of Nagorno-Karabakh. The
complimentary element is ancillary insofar as it has not affected Armenia’s “Russia decision,”
even if it remains significant in how Armenian elites conduct their foreign policy outside
Russian-relations.

Complimentary-Eurasianism in the Political Leadership
Levon Ter-Petrosyan, Armenia’s first president, has the special distinction of inculcating
Complimentary-Eurasism into the emerging political elite while simultaneously rejecting its
fundamental premises. As the accepted leader of the pro-reunification Karabakh Committee, TerPetrosyan helped define the recovery of Nagorno-Karabakh as the centerpiece of Armenian
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identity and mobilized the population behind liberation. He succeeded in transforming the
Karabakh Committee into Armenia’s first ruling party, the Pan-Armenian National Movement
(PANM), and supported Karabagh’s ‘national liberation’ war against Azerbaijan.157 By building
a post-independence identity around Nagorno-Karabakh, Ter-Petrosyan placed Yerevan in a
situation where elites would be forced eventually to seek assistance from its Russian patron to
avoid encirclement and isolation. Nevertheless, Ter-Petrosyan’s personal opposition to identityconstructed ‘maximalist’ policies encouraged him to attempt a break-out from the constructed
reality. Aware of the development of identity-dependent constructed realities he rejected
“national ideology” in favor of a pragmatic-realist approach. In this sense he rejected each
element of the constructed reality.
First, Ter-Petrosyan claimed that Armenia’s principal security guarantee was
“normalization of relations with our neighbors” and accordingly expressed a sincere desire to
“establish mutually beneficial bilateral relations with Turkey.” Second, he rejected the notion
that Russia could serve as a definitive protector and warned that the Armenian people had lost
faith in Russia as the “guarantor of our people’s survival.”158 Amicable relations with Russia
might still be conditioned on security and economic realities, such as membership in the CIS, but
according to Ter-Petrosyan they could no longer afford the “illusion that our national aspirations
will be fulfilled sometimes by Western Europeans, and more typically by Russia...committing to
this idea has cost us dearly.”159 Armenian engagement with post-Soviet and Russian institutions
in the initial period should therefore not be viewed as a product of the Eurasian affiliation, but as
the consequence of Ter-Petrosyan’s “pragmatic” approach.
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Nevertheless, he understood Armenia’s acute military and economic insecurity, and
therefore increased Armenia’s security dependence on Russia and the CIS. For example, TerPetrosyan was quick to call on Russia and other signatories of the CIS Security Treaty (the
predecessor to the 1994 Collective Security Treaty) to fulfill their treaty obligations and aid
Armenia during the conflict with Azerbaijan.160 Russian military assistance, in excess of 1 billion
USD, and critical fuel provisions had been instrumental in procuring Armenia’s military
victory.161 It was therefore only natural for Ter-Petrosyan to recognize Russia’s vital place within
the complementarity policy, and he justified membership in the CIS and the CST as a
precondition for procuring further military-political support. In particular, Yerevan stood to gain
a military edge from the dispersal of Soviet weaponry associated with membership in the CST.162
Despite Ter-Petrosyan’s ever-complimentary rhetoric, Armenia inhabited a constructed reality,
even if the president rejected its implications, and therefore he was compelled by Armenia’s geopolitical necessity to find security in Russia. These were the justifications for the deepening of
bi-lateral relations, culminating in military-cooperation agreements in 1996 and the first effective
security alliance in the 1997 “Armenian-Russian Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation, and
Mutual Assistance.” Prior to signing the agreement, however, Ter-Petrosyan, noted that the
treaty could not be viewed as an instrument for resolving the Karabakh conflict, which he
insisted required a complimentary approach, possibly involving Armenian concessions.163
Although Ter-Petrosyan was not personally a subscriber to the identity-ideological
narrative that valorized Russia as patron-in-chief, his policies encouraged elite and public
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identification with Russia. One major organization, known as the Armenian’s People Initiative
Russia-Belarus-Armenia, attracted over a million signatures (about half the population) and
insisted that Ter-Petroysan set up a referendum for membership in the newly established Union
State of Russia and Belarus. Indeed, Ter-Petrosyan was not entirely mistaken when he defended
his (allegedly insufficient) outreach to Russia by claiming that more had been done for bilateral
relations with Russia than in the last “300 years of Russo-Armenian ties.”164 Nevertheless, TerPetrosyan’s commitment to the multi-vectored policy and his sincere belief in rapprochement to
resolve Nagorno-Karabakh proved unsustainable.
Finally, in 1997, Ter-Petrosyan made his definitive error when he crossed the red-line of
Armenia’s Complimentary-Eurasianism: Nagorno-Karabakh. Driven to upend the status quo of
blockade and isolation, Ter-Petrosyan had endorsed the controversial phased approach produced
by the OSCE Minsk Group, which required concessions such as returning regions adjacent to
Nagorno-Karabakh, then under Armenian occupation, back to Azerbaijan.165 He asserted that the
current situation offered “only one option, a compromise solution” and that a “strategy of
maximalism” in Nagorno-Karabakh would lead to the “ultimate destruction of Karabakh.” In
reality, the ‘strategy of maximalism’ was an essential part of the post-independence identity and
Ter-Petrosyan concessionary posture aroused massive opposition from the political opposition
and PANM. Notes from 1998 ministerial discussions reveal how ruling-party elites had adopted
the constructed reality despite Ter-Petrosyan. Major Armenian leaders in the meeting of the
National Security Council, including Robert Kocharyan (the first president of NagornoKarabakh, then Prime Minister and future president), Vazgen Sargsyan (a popular paramilitary
leader then serving as Defense Minister, and briefly Prime Minister under Kocharyan), Serzh
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Sargsyan (then Interior Minister and later Prime Minister and President), and Arkadi Ghukasyan
(then the president of Nagorno-Karabakh), refused to give ground over Nagorno-Karabakh. They
downplayed the effect of Nagorno-Karabakh on Armenia’s economic isolation (“the blockades
do not affect Armenia’s economic development...it is not an obstacle to foreign investment...the
example of Israel shows it is possible to develop even under conditions of isolation”), insisted
that political isolation was impossible (“Russia and Iran will help us,”), and warned that
“Azerbaijan might renege on the agreement with any pretext.”166 Every core element of the
constructed reality was here on display among Armenian elites; intransigence on NagornoKarabakh, Russia as a patron-protector, and the danger inherent in the Azeri-Turkic ‘other.’ TerPetrosyan’s rejection of the constructed reality proved his downfall, and only a month after the
argument he was deposed by his ministers.
Robert Kocharyan, who replaced Ter-Petrosyan with the backing of factions inclined
towards a firmer Eurasian strategy, brought the so-called Russophile ‘Karabakh clan’ into office.
They would remain in power until the 2018 Velvet Revolution. Under Kocharyan and his
successor, Serzh Sargsyan, the discourse around Nagorno-Karabakh hardened and negotiations
with Azerbaijan and Turkey over the contested territory stalled.167 Kocharyan invigorated the
push for recognition of the 1915 Armenian genocide as ethno-nationalist politics assumed a
larger role in the public discourse and reformulated the dynamic of relations around ArmenianTurkic relations.168 Kocharyan did, however, embrace the complimentary course in the search for
economic development and optionality. Alongside Foreign Minister Oskanian, Kocharyan
branched out to Euro-Atlantic structures, such as the Council of Europe, and trumpeted
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Armenia’s European identity. The EU encouraged this outreach by including Armenia in the
EU’s 2004 European Neighborhood Policy initiative, which was welcomed by Kocharyan and
his advisers.169 But Armenia’s constructed reality, unlike Georgia's, was never premised on an
exclusive cultural affiliation to Europe. Outreach to Western institutions therefore were strictly
delimited. Kocharyan expressed no interest in joining NATO, for example, and limited
Yerevan’s engagement in its 2005 IPAP to democratic and defense reforms.170 This contrasts
starkly with Saakashvili’s IPAP which opened with a declaration that Georgia’s “strategic
objectives” are “membership of NATO and integration with the European Union.”171 Instead,
Nagorno-Karabakh remained central to the Armenian identity and as a result, Kocharyan’s
national strategy was defined by its ‘Russia-first’ mentality and Eurasian tilt.172 This strategy
included a deliberate push to increase Russia’s presence in the economic sphere to match its preexisting military commitments, especially after 2003, when Kocharyan’s ministry invited
(discussed in section 3) Russian investment through debt-for-asset swaps. Accompanying
Kocharyan’s policy was a discursive commitment to Russia, presented in media, press releases,
and interviews, that emphasized Russia’s position as the “caring” patron.173 Kocharyan’s
administration, in effect, embedded the post-independence constructed reality into policy and
rhetoric by its devotion to Russia and hardened ‘othering’ of Turkey and Armenia. By the end of
Kocharyan’s administration—mostly as a product of inviting a larger Russian role in the Russian
economy—Armenia had added complete economic dependence to its extant security dependence
on Russia.
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Sargsyan was elected to the presidency amid a political storm over electoral fairness and
growing concern for Armenia’s deepening dependence on Russia. To manage these difficulties,
he secured normalizing protocols with Turkey (rejected by the Turkish parliament) and persisted
with Yerevan’s restrained Euro-Atlantic engagement with the European Union and NATO’s
Partnership to Peace. In reality Sargsyan, along with his pro-Russian foreign minister, Eduard
Nalbandyan, were reverting to the superficial approach to the complimentary policy, complete
with an obvious bias for Russian security paternalism. In 2010, for example, they extended for a
half-century the lease on a Russian military base in Armenia that Ter-Petrosyan had conceded in
1995, and explicitly tied it to Russia’s protective role in Nagorno-Karabakh.174 Sargsyan
combined his appreciation for contemporary Russian assistance—including enormous Russian
investments and extant security commitments—with an historical appreciation for Russia’s role
as Armenia’s permanent “friend and partner.”175 Nalbandyan went so far as to admit Russia’s
role as Yerevan’s “savior.”176 In 2013, Sargsyan confirmed the prejudice in the complementarity
policy when Yerevan withdrew from negotiations for a EU Association Agreement and joined
the Russian-led Eurasian Customs Union (later the EAEU). Sargsyan’s decision represented the
decisive moment of official affiliation. In contrast with the CIS, the EAEU is a supranational
entity with an institutional commitment reminiscent of the European Union. Armenia’s
commitment to the Eurasian bloc thereby represents a “Russia decision” that precludes complete
integration in a competing bloc.
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The 2018 Velvet Revolution ended the controversial rule of the Karabakh clan and
invited speculation that Armenian-Russian relations could deteriorate. Nevertheless, as in the
case of Georgian Dream, the change in political leadership has failed to reverse Armenia’s
“Russia decision.” Armenia’s new prime minister and the leader of the revolution, Nikol
Pashinyan, who previously led the anti-EAEU Way Out faction, has assumed the
Complimentary-Eurasian constructed reality despite his previous skepticism. The concept of
Eurasian integration, in particular, has emerged in Pashinyan’s discourse as a recurring theme
and desired outcome.177 In fact, Pashinyan has become a vocal supporter of the EAEU, such as
calling for the expansion of EAEU free-trade agreements with Asian countries. With regards to
Nagorno-Karabakh, Pashinyan assumed a posture decidedly more maximalist than Kocharyan or
Sargsyan when he declared for unification between Armenia and Karabakh and proclaimed
“Artsakh is Armenia, and that’s it.”178 Unsurprisingly, Pashinyan’s posture vis-a-vis NagornoKarabakh has come with a rhetorical push to “raise the level of relations” with Russia.179 To
shore up his post-revolution relations with Moscow, Pashinyan even committed troops to Syria
upon Moscow’s request, earning a favorable response from Russian Defense Minister Sergey
Shoigu, who congratulated his ministerial counterpart for being the “the first to respond to our
call for providing assistance to the Syrian people.”180 As in Georgia, therefore, the consolidation
and durability of the elite constructed reality has limited the availability of alternative trajectories
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for Armenia. Although political turnover has elevated the opposition into office, Yerevan’s
affiliation with Russia and Eurasian trajectory remained durable and unaltered.
Diagram 2: Constructed Realities and ‘Institutional Engagement’
Constructed
Reality

Key Elements of Fixed ‘Median’
Constructed Reality

Armenia:
ComplementaryEurasianism

Commitment to Nagorno-Karabagh;
historical patronage and immediate
protection by Russia and Eurasian sphere
against Turkish and Azeri ‘other’;
secondary ‘complementary’ European
identity.
‘European’ identity and political destiny;
national souverainism (territorial unity);
anti-Russian sentiment.

Georgia: EuroAtlanticism

Outcomes of Elite
Constructed Realities
(examples)
Security alliance with Russia;
engagement in CIS and
CSTO; limited association
with NATO and EU;
integration into EAEU.
Membership in GUAM,
defection from CIS and CST,
integrative steps towards
NATO and EU.

Section 3: Economic Dependence
Theoretical Framework
Definition
According to the political economist, Albert O. Hirschman, a minor power is
economically dependent upon a larger power when it is difficult or costly for the smaller state to
replace the major power’s market share or economic impact, and therefore the major power
acquires influence over the minor power.

Economic Dependence and Foreign Policy
Existing literature on economic dependence tends to concentrate on whether larger
powers can reliably deploy their leverage to achieve political goals over small powers. Realists
tend to express skepticism towards the efficacy of economic statecraft, prioritizing hard military
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power over softer linkages. Neo-liberals, by contrast, may place excessive stress on the
relationship between small state acquiescence and economic sanctions/incentives from the larger
partner. Many studies, nevertheless, have demonstrated links between the degree of economic
dependence and foreign policy. Some have adopted similar analytical approaches to this
research, such as framing foreign policy in terms of elite priorities and economic dependence.
For example, Wen Zha found that the comparatively higher level of economic dependence of
Thailand on China, in contrast with the Philippines, had a pro-Chinese intervening effect on
Thailand’s elite-run foreign-policy.181 Furthermore, quantitative reviews generally report an
affirmative relationship between trade vulnerability and foreign policy acquiescence.182

Economic Dependence and Elites in the Near Abroad
The post-Soviet states present a special challenge for researchers. Constituent republics
lost many pre-Soviet networks and became interwoven into the USSR’s central economic
structure. While that structure disintegrated intra-republican linkages nevertheless endured after
independence. This dynamic has allowed scholars to interrogate economic dependence in the
near abroad, specifically on Russia, as a function of small state foreign policy activity. As a
result, dependence studies in the post-Soviet space tend to amalgamate the implications of
economic reliance with elite preferences. Certain behaviors correspond with economic reliance;
post-Soviet states dependent on Russia endanger the political control of ruling elites if they
pursue a foreign policy path that invites economic shock by ‘breaking-out’ from Russian
economic interests.183 As in Ukraine, where newly empowered elites with their own anti-Russian
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constructed reality defected from Moscow in 2013, elites can nevertheless reorient their
asymmetrically dependent economies away from Russia and towards the West, although at high
costs to national economic and security interests.184 Alternatively, if elites view the cost of
defection from Moscow as unpalatable, or value extant economic and security relations with
Russia, then further integration in Russia’s post-Soviet framework is a plausible outcome. The
extent and direction of economic dependence therefore includes conditions that pre-dated
independence as well as succeeded it.

Hypothesis
The extent of economic dependence in Georgia and Armenia is concurrently a product of
pre-existing and developing economic conditions as well as deliberate policy choices by political
elites. This section illustrates the trajectory of economic dependence with Russia or the West
over time, and then provides snapshots of how elites in Armenia and Georgia responded to these
changes by expanding or curbing engagement with Russia in their foreign policies. In blockaded
Armenia, the drift towards ‘Russian affiliation’ was in large part due to the value of post-Soviet
linkages, and the conscious response of political elites in Yerevan, who struggled to attract
Western investment, was to maintain and later deepen extant dependence on Russia to attain
valuable developmental and fiscal priorities. In Georgia, after an initial period of high
dependence and similar (though begrudging) maintenance of post-Soviet linkages, Tbilisi
attracted higher investment and economic intercourse from the West, which further encouraged
elites, already prejudiced towards the West, to associate with Euro-Atlantic economic structures.
In effect, the extent and direction of ‘Russia relations’ corresponds with the degree of economic
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dependence between the subject state and the post-Soviet space, and this is reflected in the
economic foreign policy of Armenian and Georgian elites.

Section 3A: Armenia and Economic Dependence on Russia
Economic Context in Period 1: Collapsing and Maintained Post-Soviet Links
The collapse of the Soviet Union destroyed the coordinated economic structure of the
integrated whole, leaving newly independent states with economic fragments devoid of the
USSR’s deliberate interconnectivity. For the South Caucasus, the markers of this process were
conveyed by closures of Soviet routes across new national boundaries, extreme disruptions to
trade and industry, and energy crises. Armenia faced four interrelated economic calamities in the
immediate aftermath of independence: industrial depression, hyper-inflation, trade blockades,
and energy shortages. These challenges compounded already difficult efforts to rebuild after the
mass-fatality 1988 Spitak earthquake, which killed between 25,000 and 50,000 Armenians and
shut down the massive Medzamor nuclear power.185
Industrial depression followed the loss of inputs from the breakdown in reliable trade and
trade routes in the near abroad. Armenia declined in 1992 by 37.5 percent of GDP as industrial
sectors cratered. Light industry essentially ceased to exist. Industry’s percentage of GDP dropped
fifteen points as agriculture came to account for nearly half of production. Before independence,
it had constituted less than 15 percent of GDP.186 At the same time, price liberalization,
introduced to fight shortages, brought prices to precarious levels relative to average income.
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Compared with the first months of 1991, inflation rose nearly 650 percent in early 1992, before
escalating into a dramatic hyper-inflationary spiral the next year.187
In 1993, Azerbaijan and Turkey imposed a blockade on Armenia for its support of
Nagorno-Karabakh. The blockade effectively destroyed Armenia’s traditional trade routes. As a
landlocked country, Armenia’s only remaining cross-border routes passed through Iran and
Georgia, and neither country, for geo-political reasons around the US-Iran conflict and the
Russo-Georgian conflict, could provide a reliable route for commerce’s desired destinations in
the immediate post-independence period.188 The blockade, still in force today, is inextricably
linked with the current status of Nagorno-Karabakh, and each party to the secessionist
controversy is aware of this reality. Such durability captures the geo-political outlook of
Armenian and Azeri elites—as well as, according to this thesis, Georgian elites vis-a-vis
Abkhazia and South Ossetia—who prize in their constructed realities a territorial nationalism
potent enough to dig in over the crisis and therefore prolong the blockade. It is a permanent
feature of Armenia's post-Soviet economic history and a significant reason for Armenia’s lack of
alternative economic partnerships. For example, once the blockade was practically in force in
1992, Armenia suffered from a severe long-term energy crisis.189 For the next four years,
Armenian energy customers averaged approximately two-hours of electricity usage per day.
Without the Medzamor plant or access to reliable overland Soviet-era pipelines, Armenia had to
scrape off its insufficient domestic hydropower with catastrophic consequences for industry and
living standards.
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As Soviet links across the South Caucasus were suddenly interrupted, if not outright
destroyed, by political volatility, economic linkages with the near abroad cratered. Yerevan’s
trade dependence on the former Soviet Union precipitously dropped; post-Soviet countries went
from importing 98 percent of Armenia’s exports in 1988 to 18.8 percent in 2002 while the share
of imports from the FSU (former Soviet Union) dropped from a near-monopoly to 22 percent.190
Diplomatic stabilization with the 1994 ceasefire preceded a broader recovery that allowed
Armenia to draw in markets beyond the post-Soviet space. The search for compensatory markets
coincided with Russian instability that wounded Armenia’s export-import trade. Russia’s
financial crisis in 1998, in particular, wreaked havoc on exports to CIS markets, which plunged
as much as 30 percent.191 As a result of that persistent, but retrospectively temporary,
macroeconomic instability, as well as Armenian trade and fiscal liberalization over the same
period, the European Union and the United States captured substantial market shares. They were
also providing significant amounts of humanitarian financial aid at a time when Russia was
effectively incapacitated by internal strife.192 This was the economic situation that flourished
under the original complementarity policy, and it is not difficult to see how Armenia’s
flourishing ‘first-contact’ with the West aroused developmental interest among the elite.
Much has been exaggerated of this period, however, and several qualifications are
required to qualify the decline in dependence. First, much of the value in Armenian exports to
the West, particularly the European Union in this period, were processed diamonds. Armenia’s
diamond industry, though prestigious and fast-growing, employed no more than 4,000 workers,
generally skilled labor. Non-precious metal exports to the EU, by contrast, were cheap labor-
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intensive goods, such as alcohol products.193 Since the diamonds are imported, and only the
processing occurs in Armenia, it is important to review a value-added analysis of Armenian
exports. When the analysis shifts from total value of exports to the value added (gross exports of
a product excluding gross imports of the same product), the EU’s market share of Armenian
exports in 2000 falls from over 35 percent to 13 percent.194 European importers of lower value
goods, such as apparel, could not generally justify the higher transport costs associated with the
Armenian blockade. Only high value goods, like precious stones, were valued enough to warrant
expensive air transport over the blockade.195
Second, Armenia’s economic structure was pre-determined by Soviet command
structures, and that configuration had a direct effect on Armenia’s trade direction. Exports to the
near abroad reflected the capital-intensive and resource priorities of the Soviet economic
structure. Armenian exporters enjoyed an empirical advantage in these markets relative to postSoviet competitors given Soviet experience and sustained contact.196 Armenia’s larger import
market likewise drew its strength from CIS members. Not only did these states, and particularly
Russia, collectively top the list of exporters to Armenia, but they also dominated the all-strategic
energy supply that Yerevan depended upon to ward off a repeat of the 1992-6 energy crisis that
had devastated the economy.
Third, trade alone formed an insufficient metric to gauge levels of dependence. The nondiamond value of Armenian exports formed less than 10 percent of national GDP.197 Armenia
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also suffered from a potent export concentration, again relative to other CIS countries, that made
valuable sectors susceptible to price swings on small selection of products. Contrary to the
export-orientation of many developing countries, Armenia’s economic growth was
disproportionately earned from services (in particular, telecommunications) and construction.198
These three points illustrate the partial superficiality of the West’s overstated stake in
Armenia. Armenian elites were not ruling over a high-growth export-focused economy that
could supply quality goods to the West, but a re-calibrating one, increasingly leaning on services
and construction. Furthermore, Russia remained a principal instrument for Armenia’s
macroeconomic stability, especially when one adjusts for the negligible domestic return offered
by the precious valuable trade with the EU and the historical familiarity of Armenia’s traditional
heavy industries with the geography of the post-Soviet market. CIS markets were evolving into
dynamic markets that offered a comparative advantage to Armenian exporters.199 Direct financial
assistance was also supplied by the Russian Central Bank, which provided the credit necessary
for Yerevan to implement budget consolidation.

Elites and Institutional Engagement in Period 1: Post-Soviet Links as Stability
With regards to Armenia’s formal economic ‘affiliation,’ national elites continued to
prioritize Russian and post-Soviet linkages. In fact, the declining dependence of Armenia on
Russia should not obscure its considerable size nor its increasing importance, and Armenian
elites understood this reality. The Armenian government faced a general crisis, arising out of the
post-Soviet security situation, that presented the possibility of complete economic isolation due
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to the blockade, a lack of strategic alternatives in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the weakness of postSoviet Russia. Therefore, in this moment of extreme insecurity and economic confusion,
Armenian elites prioritized salvaging post-Soviet networks. Even in the later 1990s, when trade
with the West picked up and Russia tumbled into financial crisis, Yerevan focused on integrating
into the economic support structure of the post-Soviet world. Though economic dependence on
Russia in absolute terms declined, Armenian elites highly valued the surviving ties with Russia
and eagerly worked to maintain the post-Soviet linkages. This would, in turn, increase Armenia’s
economic dependence on Russia over the next period and perpetuate the cycle.
Yerevan’s economic prioritization on Russia can first be evinced by the repeated attempts
of political elites to preserve strategic post-Soviet agreements regarding currency. Despite
extreme political volatility, Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Estonia,
Lithuania, Ukraine, Belarus, and Turkmenistan all introduced new currencies or announced their
intention to form them. Facing extreme inflationary pressures in excess of 100 percent per month
in late 1993 and a collapse in GDP that eventually reached 61.2 percent of the pre-independence
quantity, Armenian elites came to view the vestigial currency links as a source of desirable
stability. It was clear that Armenia would suffer from the disintegration of the ruble zone and
endure a catastrophic reversal in inter-republican terms of trade (TOT) in excess of 30 percent.200
Ter-Petrosyan and his prime minister, Hrant Bagratyan, reacted to the crisis by stressing
Armenia’s commitment to the ruble zone.201 They were not tempted to defect by the enthusiasm
shown by new currencies. In fact, Armenian elites were quite determined to keep this powerful
post-Soviet monetary system intact. Only Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia stood to gain from
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the implicit GDP transfers that would follow the end of the ruble zone, and the financial fallout
would be dire for the fragile Armenian economy.202 Ter-Petrosyan and Bagratyan worked to
create the so-called ‘new style ruble zone’ (NSRZ) with an explicit drive towards “economic
convergence” with Russia and committed partners, but the agreement collapsed when Russia
insisted that the republics introduce their own currencies first and then demonstrate their
commitment to monetary convergence. Ter-Petrosyan noted that “it was Russia itself that stood
outside the ruble zone” as the NSRZ disintegrated and an independent Armenian currency was
established. Despite the failure of the NSRZ, Armenian elites had demonstrated their
commitment to post-Soviet structures, perhaps even more so than the Kremlin. In the same
speech, Ter-Petrosyan noted his determination to find “productive and mutually advantageous
development of cooperation with Russia and the former Soviet republics.”203
Indeed, the Armenian government remained sympathetic towards post-Soviet structures,
as it pushed for regional integration while other states, such as Georgia, pursued evasive tactics
and formed regional blocs to oppose further integration. Tbilisi needed post-Soviet links to ward
off the dire economic situation, but it had little intention of strengthening a Russia-backed
superstructure. Armenian elites, by contrast, were explicit in their desire to transform the CIS
into an effective post-Soviet economic network. In 1998, Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian laid
out six focal points for Armenian foreign policy, one of which was express support for economic
integration and “free economic zones” within the CIS framework. He was clear that regional
cooperation would invite specific economic gains among the member states.204 The Armenian
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government matched its rhetoric with policy. Between 1993 and 2001, Armenia signed seven
free trade agreements (FTAs) that would remain Armenia's only FTAs until the 2008 financial
crisis. Each FTA was signed with a member of the CIS: Russia (1993), Moldova (1995),
Kyrgyzstan (1995), Ukraine (1996), Turkmenistan (1996), Georgia (1998), and Kazakhstan
(2001).205 Armenia and other sympathetic CIS states also attempted to unify regional bi-lateral
free trading agreements into a formal free trade zone, but the Russian government failed to ratify
the agreement. Nevertheless, by April 1997, the simultaneous process of internal reform and
trade liberalization in Russia and Armenia had reached a point where the Minister of Economics
could confidently inform the WTO that trade with Russia was effectively free.206 Certain
contemporary observers argued that Armenia faced an economic challenge in “breaking-out” to
the West, and that Armenia’s involvement in post-Soviet institutions captured their security
reliance on Russia.207 The foreign policy of the Armenian ministry, as illustrated above,
undermines that claim. Yerevan encouraged, albeit not always successfully, the establishment
and maintenance of post-Soviet economic ties, generally as stabilizing measure against economic
challenges, such as the currency threat or the necessity of maintaining pro-Soviet trade.

Economic Context in Period 2: Growing Reliance on Russia
Before the 2008 financial crisis, Armenia experienced a strong spurt of development that
brought double-digit GDP growth. It was fueled, in part, by a dramatic wave of foreign
investment. Unlike the export-focus economies of similar post-Soviet countries, the Armenian
economy had struggled to develop a burgeoning export-import trade. Despite Yerevan’s hyper-
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liberal trade regime, Armenian merchandise exports as a percentage of GDP remained the lowest
among FSU states.208 Macroeconomic stability, absent in the previous period, nevertheless
created the conditions necessary for concentrated investment. In 2003, the Armenian government
began to encourage foreign investment, in particular from the recently enlarged diaspora
population, into real estate. Such an approach contradicted the standard development strategy of
directing inflowing investment into exports to create sustainable FDI.209 As a result, Armenia
developed a construction-centered growth model dependent on foreign capital inflows.
In the previous period, Armenian elites had sought to defend the surviving post-Soviet
links as potential sources of stability. By the 2000s, the relative tranquility in the near abroad
allowed Armenia and Russia to not just maintain post-Soviet linkages but grow them. The
renewed dependence of Armenia on Russia in this period originated from four principal causes:
an upsurge in foreign direct investment (FDI), the rising value of remittances, energy-fiscal
reforms, and growing CIS/Russia-directed trade. Each of these developments were instrumental
in creating the growth rates that helped subdue rampant poverty from 54 percent in 2004 to 27
percent in 2008.
In 2003, FDI inflows contributed barely more than 100 million USD.210 FDI continued to
rise until 2009, when inflows peaked at 950 million USD with FDI comprising 8.3 percent of
GDP.211 Between 2000 and 2010, 72.5 percent of total FDI went towards transport,
telecommunications, electricity, gas and water, finance, and mining. During this period of FDI-
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dependent growth, Russia acquired its dominant position over Armenia’s FDI inflows. In 2006,
annual Russian investment comprised 35 percent of Armenia’s total FDI. Russia-directed
investments were concentrated in the strategic transport, telecommunications, and energy
industries, the latter of which was in the process of restructuring. In fact, Russia’s seventh-largest
greenfield project in the late 2000s was an expansion of Razdan power station.212 FDI inflows
from Russia were boosted by the activities of diasporan investors, who provided 40 percent of
non-infrastructure FDI. In fact, Armenia’s construction-oriented boom was mostly fueled by
large diasporan investments. The largest concentration of diasporan investors, unsurprisingly,
hailed from Armenia’s enormous expatriate community in Russia.213
Instability in the post-Soviet space helped grow the Armenian diaspora, and by 2011
there were more than 6 million Armenian expatriates outside the Republic of Armenia, and
perhaps as many as 2.5 million in Russia. An upsurge in economic activity in Russia, as well as
deliberate choices by Yerevan vis-a-vis the diaspora, induced a remarkable rise in the value of
remittances. By 2008, the International Labour Organization estimated that remittances
constituted 18 percent of GDP with an annual value of 1.5 billion USD, and that more than 70
percent of households received them.214 Prior to this upsurge, remittances were as low as
650,000 USD in 1995, according to estimates based on World Bank figures.215 Remittances are
widely agreed to be crucial for the Armenian economy. One survey found that remittances
comprised on average 80 percent of household income for those families receiving them, and
though this slants towards remittance-dependent households, the value is likely not much
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lower.216 From a macroeconomic perspective, remittances also provide an aggregate net gain of
0.77 percent of GDP to Armenia’s economy.217 Unsurprisingly, these inflows mostly originate in
Russia, where the largest proportion of the diasporan community is concentrated. During the
largest migratory outflows, the Russian government ensured to secure the proper treatment and
rights of Armenian migrants. For example, in 2001, Putin remarked that Armenians “must be
most kindly treated and encouraged in every way to come to Russia.”218 Russia’s share of
remittances between 2005 and 2007 amounted to approximately 80 percent of the total value.
This value does not include ‘informal’ remittances from Russia, such as consumer goods like
electronics, which 7.4 percent of households also received at the time.219 Furthermore, given
Armenia’s reliance on the agricultural sector, the disproportionate concentration of Russian
remittances in rural households added another element of central dependence.220 Any disruption
in Russo-Armenian economic ties or domestic economic turmoil in Russian sectors where
Armenian migratory workers were employed (predominantly construction) threatened the
regularity and scale of this crucially important transfer to a substantial number of the population.
The chaotic first decade of independence had placed enormous strain on Armenian
finances. The public debt problems were widely recognized by internal elites and external forces
as a serious threat to the fiscal health of the republic. In 2001, the IMF noted that the Armenian
government had “rapidly accumulated external liabilities...and are now facing an increasingly
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difficult external debt burden, relative to their ability to generate primary external and budget
surpluses.”221 Excluding institutional creditors, Russia had become Armenia’s largest bi-lateral
creditor. Alongside Turkmenistan, Moscow owned 18 percent of external debt in net present
value terms with an outstanding Armenian liability of 109 million USD in 1999.222 Armenia
struggled to service its debt to Russia, which had grown to include costs for energy supplies and
other deliveries.223 Problems with servicing the debt caused tension in Russo-Armenian relations
and threatened to hamper smooth economic relations. In 2001, Yerevan was forced to divert 20
million USD to a partial repayment when the Kremlin refused to again prolong repayment.224
Another 17 million USD of servicing remained in arrears to Russia and Turkmenistan by
2002.225 Yerevan had responded to the fiscal danger by embarking on an aggressive privatization
and reorganization of its energy sector. Armenia’s geographic location and limited economic
appeal, however, ensured that Western investors stayed away and presented no acquisition bids.
For example, the fifth block of the Hrazdan Thermal Power Plant, long unfinished, attracted no
interest from Western investors.226
Instead, Armenia conducted several debt-for-equity swaps with Russia that allowed
Yerevan to offload its debt and increase investment at the expense of further energy and
economic dependence. Financial management of the Seven Hrazdan hydropower cascade and six
hydroelectric power plants were transferred to RAO UES, Russia’s electric company, in
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exchange for complete debt forgiveness. The Medzamor nuclear power plant was placed under a
five-year lease to RAO UES as well for writing-off gas delivery debts; the plant could have only
been kept under Armenian management by continued subsidies from the government.227 The
policy continued in 2006 when Armenia permitted Gazprom to acquire the fifth bloc in exchange
for keeping gas prices stable during a period when rising prices throughout the CIS would have
forced a doubling in charges.228 These transactions provided a launchpad for further investment
by Russia in Armenia. Gazprom, for example, pledged to invest 150 million USD to complete
the fifth block.229 But they also confirmed an almost permanent energy dependence on Russia.
Heavy foreign investment introduced new opportunities for trade. While Armenia was
unable to transform into an export-oriented economy, and its trade deficit and excess
concentration remained large, Armenian exports and imports grew 5 and 3.5 times, respectively.
The increasing trade flow was generally directed towards CIS countries, which constituted in
2007 approximately 70 percent of total Armenian trade turnover.230 Armenia’s strong legal
framework with Russia and the CIS countries—developed from maintaining free trade
agreements—provided a platform to grow trade with Russia as investment from that direction
poured into Armenia.231

Elites and Institutional Engagement in Period 2: Exploiting Dependence
Armenian elites in this period prioritized encouraging capital inflows and resolving their
fiscal situation, but they were not initially biased toward any bloc in pursuit of these objectives.
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The ‘complementary’ aspect of foreign policy was especially apparent in the developmental
strategies of Armenia. Yerevan, however, struggled to attract Western investment into their
energy privatization program and wider economic sectors. As a result, Armenian elites pivoted
and agreed that engagement with Russia offered the best opportunities for fulfilling economic
objectives. Rouben Shugarian, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, elucidated this viewpoint
when he twice recognized that Russia was the “most probable potential investor into Armenia
economy” in late 2003 while still rhetorically embracing the ‘complementary policy.’232 As
predicted by Shugarian, Armenia’s economic environment was ripe for a Russian impression,
which was encouraged by the Kocharyan government and their policy of debt-for-equity swaps
and asset sales that increased Russian stakeholdership at the expense of further dependence on
Russia and post-Soviet links.
Many analysts have posed that the swaps and sales were foisted by Putin onto Kocharyan
as a form of ‘energy imperialism.’ To a certain extent it is impossible to definitively resolve this
question but framing the circumstances of the agreements helps to condition this allegation. First,
it must be understood that Yerevan was serious about overcoming structural problems and
improving its fiscal situation, but they persistently struggled to attract capital, particularly for
vital energy reforms. The Central Bank of Armenia, for example, had targeted a far lower debt
servicing value in 2002 of 90.5 million USD.233 Fiscal difficulties were also precluding
investment from Russia. Furthermore, representatives from the IMF and the World Bank were
encouraging asset handovers as a measure to reduce external indebtedness.234 Russia’s
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experience with the Armenian energy industry was an additional impetus to deepen engagement
with Moscow in this regard. For Kocharyan’s government, inviting Russian capital offered a
double positive at the expense of independence: a platform to encourage Russian investment,
particularly in an industry where Russians enjoyed traditional expertise, and substantial debt
forgiveness. Putin himself backed up this position when he remarked: “it is not about the debts, it
is about attracting Russian capital into the Armenian economy.”235 Kocharyan frequently
reiterated that the proposal had come “from our side...nobody is trying to foist anything on us.”
Indeed, he had first proposed a variant of the measure back in August 2001.236 Further evidence
for the mutual nature of the agreements can be intuited from the harder negotiating line taken by
Armenian elites. They rebuffed attempts by Moscow to score control of more valuable Armenian
industries. Gagik Khachatryan, then the Minister of Finance, remarked “each party has its own
interests...we want to clear as much debt as possible with as little property as possible...while
they want to achieve the opposite.”237 Repeated delays in the settlement illustrates that this was
not a simple submission by Yerevan; their own interests were served by attracting Russian
investment, but on appropriate terms.
Throughout the 2000s, the Armenian government consciously deepened their economic
relationship with Russia, primarily by encouraging investment. In one instance when Russian
investment had briefly dropped, Kocharyan smirkingly informed Putin that “Russia holds a
disgraceful second place in terms of foreign investments in the Armenian economy...I have a
sense that Russia will definitely hold the honorable first place by March.”238 In March 2006,
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Kocharyan’s Chief Economic Advisor, Vahram Nercissiantz, reiterated the interconnection
between Armenia's "reforms" and attracting further investment.239 Yerevan finalized several
transactions with Russian companies, including the sale of the main electricity system to
Russia’s Unified Energy System (UES) company for $73 million. Galust Sahakian, the leader of
the ruling parliamentary faction, justified it with a mix of economic pragmatism (“naturally, the
state is interested in making the possible deal the most profitable for Armenia”) and
Complimentary-Eurasianism (“...but we would not like the electricity network to be sold to, for
example, a Turkish company”). 240 As for the 2006 Hrazdan sale to Gazprom, Kocharyan
defended it by reminding critics that no other investor had shown interest in refurbishing the fifth
bloc. He asked: “is it better to have an enterprise which is half-build, exposed to the
elements...has already wasted one credit project...or to have a Russian enterprise on our
territory...an enterprise that is modern, efficient, uses less gas, and is very important to our
economy?”241 Further Russian purchases in this period included a 480 million USD sale of the
Armenian telecom system and a 570 million USD investment commitment by Russian Railways
upon its purchase of Armenian Railways.242 Various privileges were proffered on account of
Armenia’s pro-Russian economic foreign policy. In addition to facilitating the improvement of
Armenia’s energy capabilities and drastically increasing investment, Russia charged Armenia its
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lowest gas price ($110/TCM) out of all bilateral customers, amounting to less than half the price
charged on Georgia ($235/TCM).243
In this period, Armenian elites, grasping with economic isolation, employed Russian
resources and relations as a means to promote development and growth. Yerevan had made a
deliberate choice to utilize their growing economic intercourse with Russia as a springboard to
solve internal dilemmas, concurrently inviting dependence and expanding post-Soviet linkages.
These conditions laid the framework for Armenia’s definitive ‘Russia decision’ in 2013.

Economic Context in Period 3: Confirmed Trajectory
The Armenian economy was beset by two shocks in the late 2000s: the 2008 RussoGeorgian war and the Great Recession. First, the Russo-Georgia conflict endangered Armenia’s
vital transport routes by obstructing its trade corridors through friendly Georgia. Deliveries of
basic goods, such as wheat and fuel, were momentarily endangered and shortages followed.
Later that same year, the global financial crisis produced a dramatic fall in remittances (down 35
percent) and the availability of credit, leading to investment shortfalls (down 31 percent) with
catastrophic implications for the economy. Armenia’s GDP shrank by 14 percent and the
construction industry, previously the engine of the country’s 21st century growth, contracted by
nearly 42 percent.244 Post-Soviet/Eurasian linkages proved an important mechanism in
stabilization and recovery. In order to counteract the effects of the recession and jumpstart a
stimulus program, the Armenian government negotiated with the Russian finance ministry for
emergency credit; the finalized deal supplied Yerevan with a 500 million USD “stabilization
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credit” loan from the Russian government.245 Yerevan also joined the Eurasian Development
Bank (EDB), originally founded in January 2006 by President Putin and President Nazarbayev,
and the Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development (EFSD) with the express purpose of
combating the economic crisis. Armenia has been a major recipient of EFSD funding. Despite
contributing only 1 million USD (in contrast to Russia’s 7.5 billion USD), Yerevan has received
several phases of funding, including a 400 million USD loan from the EFSD in 2011 and another
300 million in 2016.246 These measures, combined with low interest rates and the gradual
recovery of remittances, helped restore stability to the Armenian economy.247
Armenia’s recovery, though slower, solidified the basic parameters of Armenia’s
economic dependence on Russia. In 2012, total net FDI reserves were 4.6 billion USD of which
53 percent hailed from CIS countries, predominantly Russia. By 2015, a quarter of all companies
in Armenia with foreign investment were receiving Russian capital.248 Remittances recovered to
15 percent of GDP and trade with Russia increased by 4 percent between 2010 and 2012 with
commodity turnover up 20 percent the subsequent year.249 Concurrently, deteriorating relations
between the European Union and Russia over Ukraine invited the possibility of Western
sanctions on Russia just as Armenia was engaged in negotiations with the European Union for an
Association Agreement. An integrative approach to the Western bloc would have threatened
intimate economic ties with Russia at a time when the two blocs appeared mutually exclusive.250
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Furthermore, integration into a Eurasian bloc offered simplified access for key Armenian sectors,
such as free moment for Armenia’s migratory (and remittance-producing) workforce in Russia,
stable gas prices during rising prices, and increased trade and investment turnover in addition to
the already considerable degree of bi-lateral trade intercourse with Russia.251 Determined to
preserve the strategic economic relationship with Russia, Yerevan announced its ‘Russia
decision’ in 2013 when it decided to join the Eurasian Customs Union (EACU)—originally
formed in 2010 by Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan—effectively ending negotiations with the
European Union. Unlike the CIS, ripe with economic false starts and integration failures, the
EACU represented a major phase towards a coherent supranational structure in the post-Soviet
space, complete with binding decision-making processes.252 In 2012, the EACU was integrated
into the larger structural framework of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which established
a single common market for member-states in addition to coordinated policies across most
sectors enforced by four intergovernmental bodies and courts.253 Armenia finalized its
membership in the EAEU in 2015 and remains a proactive member today; former Prime Minister
Tigran Sargsyan, for example, has chaired the key Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) since
2016.
Elites and Institutional Engagement in Period 3: Towards Eurasia
In the late 2000s, pro-Russian states in the near abroad, alongside Russia, were
developing a new model for post-Soviet regional economic integration through the EAEU. At the
same time, Armenia was negotiating for an EU Association Agreement as its ‘complimentary’
trade ties with the European Union were quite strong. Nevertheless, Armenian elites were
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pursuing a concurrent program of post-Soviet integration that illustrates their sustained
commitment to post-Soviet integration. In late 2012, Yerevan moved to improve the legal
framework of their extant economic relations with Russia by supporting a special free trade
agreement within the CIS. Tigran Davtyan, Sargsyan’s economic minister, emphasized that this
step would further stimulate existing trade to Armenia’s advantage and promote much needed
exports.254
This integration measure into the post-Soviet space preluded the controversial 2013
decision by Sargsyan to join the EAEU. As illustrated above, Yerevan’s decision was not simply
the consequence of Russian coercion. Admittedly, pressure was naturally exerted on Yerevan by
Moscow, particularly by ominous reference to gas prices, but that has to be conditioned by the
economic realities that Yerevan inhabited. Russia was the instrumental partner for Armenia, both
in terms of providing security and in terms of economic partnership. It was no surprise then that
after Yerevan's decision to join the Customs Union that Armenian business largely supported the
confirmed trajectory, favoring a Eurasian direction over the prospect of implausibly high EU
standards and a comparatively unfamiliar marketplace.255 Furthermore, even before the alleged
coercion occurred, Sargsyan stated that Armenia could join the Customs Union and inquired
about specific paths to membership. His prime minister, Tygran Sargsyan, who opposed joining
the EEU because Armenia shares no borders with Russia, nevertheless agreed that Armenia
needed a special form of cooperation with the Customs Union.256 For Yerevan, keeping low gas
prices and fostering flexible relations with Russia took precedence over a Euro-Atlantic
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outreach.257 Further integration into the Eurasian sphere (e.g. the EAEU) offered the prospect of
freer access to the market of the ‘Common Economic Space, further investment inflows into
export production, free moment of capital, and the abolition of customs duties for the already
prevalent flow of Armenian goods and services into the Eurasian marketplace.258
The incorporation of export duty waivers (associated with ECU ascension) into reduced
gas prices, for example, were projected by the IMF to save Armenia a substantial 1.5 percent of
GDP per year.259 In effect, Armenia’s pre-existing and growing dependence ensured that
economic association with Russia was prioritized. Membership in the EAEU would secure and
develop the linkages maintained and formed over the past two periods.
At the time, Sargsyan’s decision to join the EEU and then the EAEU (finalized in 2015)
were highly controversial among the public. As discussed in the previous section, however,
much of the opposition, legitimately concerned over Sargsyan’s tendency towards
authoritarianism, saw integration into the EAEU “as the right step” and recognized that the
maneuver had been motivated by pragmatism.260 Nor did participation in the EAEU preclude
limited outreach to the West: Armenia has attempted to deliberately ‘bridge’ the European Union
and the Eurasian Union. For example, Armenia negotiated a ‘Comprehensive and Enhanced
Partnership Agreement’ with the European Union into 2017, although this ‘engagement’ is not
commensurate to a full Association Agreement.261 Today, membership in EAEU is generally
accepted, even though the supposedly anti-EAEU faction assumed power after the 2018 Velvet
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Revolution. For Armenia, displacing Russia would incur enormous costs that no government has
appeared willing to stomach. To the contrary, further integrative measures have been the default
reaction of an Armenian elite unwilling to risk displacing their patron.

Section 3B: Georgia’s Economic Dependence on Russia
Economic Context in Period 1: Temporary Dependence
As in Armenia, Georgia’s economic condition following independence was marked by
extreme precarity. The chaotic political condition within Georgia, combined with the collapse of
Soviet-era linkages, resulted in a situation nearly identical to that in Yerevan: steep declines in
GDP across all sectors, hyper-inflation (especially severe in Georgia), and energy shortages.262
Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, Tbilisi had received about a quarter of its electricity
and almost all of its raw materials and energy sources from Russia. In 1991, approximately twothirds of Georgian exports were destined for Russia.263 Immediately following independence,
Tbilisi implemented a brief but disastrous self-imposed blockade on Russian trade that wreaked
havoc on its economy. But once the political environment stabilized in 1994, the Georgian
economy began to recover, and GDP growth reached double digits. Credit from international
financing corporations supplied Tbilisi with the necessary finances to control inflation and
establish a new currency.264 Aggressive privatization and internal reform expedited the recovery,
though the structural changes made for uneven socio-economic conditions.265
Georgia’s economic dependence on Russia was pronounced in two sectors: trade and
energy. Georgia’s economy was largely reliant on Russian/CIS trade for both imports and

262

Herzig, The New Caucasus, 122-132.
Jones, 188
264
Ibid, 190.
265
Ibid, 190.
263

92

exports as a product of the integrated Soviet legacy. In 1995, the CIS imported 62 percent of
Georgian exports and supplied 45 percent of Georgian imports. For example, Russia imported
about 75 percent of Georgia’s growing wine market, which constituted an average of 10 percent
of Georgian exports, and was the primary consumer of Georgia’s leading export, scrap metal.
Oil, gas, and hydrocarbons, largely inbound from Russia and Azerbaijan, made up over a third of
total imports.266 Russia’s economic imprint was substantial enough to spark a major economic
crisis in Georgia—Armenia was also affected—as a result of Russia’s default during the 1998ruble crisis. In addition, Tbilisi racked up enormous debts for energy deliveries from Russia; the
controversy around these debts would eventually serve as the impetus for domestic energy
reform. As discussed below, Georgian elites initially reacted to these realities much in the same
way as their Armenian counterparts: by deepening (albeit more conditionally) their institutional
engagement with Russia.
Unlike landlocked Armenia, however, which was restricted in the pursuit of an
alternative economic direction by the blockade and unpalatable transport costs, Georgia’s
superior geographic position allowed for a broader reconnection with the non-Soviet space and
the Black Sea region. Dependence on Russia rapidly declined after 1995 and engagement with
regional and Western markets earned momentum. Turkey, for example, displaced Russia as
Georgia’s major export market in 2000 as it developed a flourishing consumer goods exchange
with Tbilisi and also became a primary importer of the Georgian scrap-metal. Over the same
period, Georgia tripled its exports to the European Union to 18 percent. Germany, in particular,
played an instrumental role in the new connectivity as Berlin captured 10 percent of the
Georgian export market by 2000. The largest Georgian export to the European Union, hazelnuts,
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was one of the few high value products in Georgia’s fragmented trade repertoire of mostly lowvalue goods destined for CIS countries.267 At the same time, Georgia managed to secure its place
in the Transcaucasian energy network through the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, completed in April
1999.268 It was the first oil pipeline between Georgia and Azerbaijan and a preliminary to
Georgia’s eventual energy independence from Russia. In effect, Georgia’s reconnection with the
outside world recalibrated its trade distribution and mitigated its dependence, therefore providing
a platform from which to encourage greater intercourse and possible integration with the West.

Elites and Institutional Engagement in Period 1: Uneasy Engagement
Georgian elites faced the challenge of managing their hyper-dependence on Russian
economic links while concurrently resisting Russia in the military-security realm. After a
disastrous experience of Euro-Atlantic exclusivity under Gamsakhurdia, Tbilisi recognized its
high interconnectivity with Russia and cautiously engaged in Russian and post-Soviet economic
institutions. Nevertheless, Georgian Euro-Atlanticism conditioned that outreach and limited the
extent that Georgia was willing to stomach further outreach. For Tbilisi, dependence on Russia
was an impediment destined to be overcome, and they exemplified this policy by obstructing
measures in the post-Soviet space for Russian-led integration. As Georgia’s economic trajectory
shifted beyond the near abroad, Georgian elites moved to de-leverage their extant commitments
to Russian-led institutions.
In 1991, Gamsakhurdia attempted a premature ‘defection’ from Russia. This defection
was not inspired by any economic rationale and simply reflected the extreme manifestation of
Euro-Atlanticism. He practically imposed a self-blockade by attempting to embargo Russia
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without recognizing the depth of Soviet economic integration. The severe decline in living
standards that succeeded the blockade imperiled the popularity of the leadership and contributed
to Gamsakhurdia’s defeat.269 Contemporary economic conditions were clearly not suitable for a
definitive ‘Russia decision’ at the time. Even for the Euro-Atlantic elite—already furious with
Russia over its treatment secessionist states—the political and economic costs associated with
defection made it prohibitive. Instead, they followed the Armenian path and approached postSoviet institutions as unavoidable instruments of stability. Shevardnadze highlighted the
economic dimension of Georgia’s controversial ascension to the CIS in these terms. He argued
that Georgia needed to “end our economic isolation” by “renewing traditional economic ties to
the other states of the former USSR.”270 In trying to convince the Georgian parliament to ratify
ascension to the CIS, Shevardnadze insisted that Georgia had to "restore broken economic links
and develop them on a completely new basis, which is a necessary prerequisite for the reforms
for transition to a market economy” and that the CIS would help “promote stabilization, and halt
the decline in the population's standard of living.” At this stage, Georgia needed the CIS as much
for an economic reprieve as it needed it to end the civil war.
As Georgia’s macroeconomic situation normalized and Georgian economic connectivity
with the West intensified, however, further Russia-directed integration within the CIS ceased to
be a necessity. Instead, the Georgian government worked towards an intra-FSU organization that
would collaboratively encourage Euro-Atlantic economic outreach and impede further CIS
integration. In 1997, the Georgian, Azerbaijan, and Moldovan governments (later joined by
Ukraine) formed the regional ‘GUUAM’ organization, representing those states in the near
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abroad with Euro-Atlantic biases or anti-Russian slants. Though partially motivated by politicalmilitary features that emanated from perceived Russian involvement in the secessionist
territories and controversies over the CIS Collective Security Treaty, GUUAM’s objectives also
reflected an acute distrust of further CIS-directed economic integration, especially during a
period of declining dependence on Russia. For participating countries, pro-integration objectives
like the CIS free trade zone (supported by Armenia), the CIS Economic Council, the CIS
Customs and Payments Unions were merely "economic levers by Russia," and instead memberstates should 'break out' by integrating into "transatlantic and European structures." 271 In policy
terms, GUUAM succeeded in promoting anti-Russian economic cooperation, such as a joint
effort to avoid Russian transport taxes on Central Asian goods.272 The drive towards overcoming
economic dependence, predictably, gained additional purchase after the disastrous system-wide
downturn in the 1998 Russian financial crisis.
Georgian elites in this period confronted severe economic instability and high
dependence on Russia. Though they were inclined to the Euro-Atlantic trajectory,
Gamsakhurdia’s example had shown that outright defection from Russia, given Georgia’s
extensive dependence on post-Soviet networks, was incompatible with political survival. Instead,
Shevardnadze and his colleagues embraced a cautious approach to the CIS until Georgia’s
degree of economic dependence had decreased to manageable levels, at which point Georgia
could pursue a more determined Euro-Atlantic policy, as evinced by Tbilisi’s participation in
GUUAM.
Economic Context in Period 2 and Period 3: ‘Breaking-Out’
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The Rose Revolution triggered a slate of neo-liberal reforms relating to privatization,
coherent taxation, debt reduction, and free trade. The ensuing improvement in the business
environment and rising domestic demand sparked a surge in foreign investment. Similarly to
Armenia, Georgian economic growth initially became dependent on loans, investments, and
transfers from abroad, mostly concentrated in the energy, construction, and trade sectors. But the
sources of Georgia investment contrasted quite sharply with that of Armenia. In fact, the defining
feature of the post-revolutionary era was declining economic dependence on Russia and rising
dependence on the West was the expansion of Euro-Atlantic investment and direct assistance.
First, although remittances grew by almost 7 times in the second period, they constituted
a comparatively smaller proportion of Georgia’s economy. Remittances peaked in 2008 at about
1 billion USD and averaged around 6 percent of GDP per year. Unsurprisingly, most Georgian
migrants worked in Russia, which had an estimated 200 thousand Georgian workers, and sent
nearly 65 percent of total remittances back to Georgia.273 When adjusted against Armenia’s
smaller population, however, Georgian remittances from Russia constituted a far smaller value
per capita. Remittances have accordingly not featured prominently in Russo-Georgian relations.
Second, in contrast to remittances, FDI and direct assistance was instrumental in
Georgia’s development. Total FDI, attracted by Georgia’s privatization reforms, quadrupled
from its pre-revolution levels to reach 2 billion USD in 2007.274 Total investment stock shrank
after the 2008 war and the global recession but then returned to average about 1.7 billion USD
per year from 2014 to 2018. The defining feature of this uptick in FDI was the concentrated level
of Euro-Atlantic investment. Collectively, EU member-states attained the position of principal
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investor in Georgia, though the United States was the single largest bi-lateral investor. At the
height of the investment surge in 2007, investment from EU member-states provided nearly 60
percent of Georgia’s total FDI, and they retain that predominant status today.275 Furthermore, the
value of these investments, according to the IMF, remain “crucial” for Georgia’s economic
development.276 Georgia’s 2015 EU Association Agreement has reinforced the trajectory by
encouraging further European investment into the economy, including a massive 3.8 billion USD
program for Georgian infrastructure as part of the Eastern Partnership; Armenia has been allotted
only about a quarter of that value.277 By contrast, Russia’s stake never accounted for more than
10 percent of FDI after 1996, when total investment were already relatively low, and its share
was effectively crowded out by Western investments. FDI from Russia even briefly became
negative in 2013, indicating that the threat of Russian FDI withdrawal represents a negligible
threat to the Georgian economy.278 Against the example of Armenia, Georgia is not dependent on
Russian investment.
Therefore, in definitional terms the extent of dependence on Russia has declined. The
largest investments, the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the ‘Southern Corridor’
(Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum) natural gas pipeline, were considered to be central elements of the
Euro-Atlantic energy strategy in a collective effort to reduce dependence on Russia. The former
was largely encouraged by the United States to weaken Russian and Iranian regional influence,
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and the latter by the European Union to increase the energy independence of its member states.
Tbilisi was also among the largest per capita recipients of direct US aid, amounting to nearly 1
billion USD between 2001 and 2007. After the 2008 war, Georgia received nearly 500 million
euros in post-conflict assistance from the European Union.
In 2005, Georgia was awarded a 295 million USD grant by the U.S Millennium
Challenge Corporation for transport and pipeline infrastructure.279 The construction of these
pipelines strengthened the economic autonomy of Georgia, reduced Russian influence, and
confirmed the pre-eminent position of ‘Western actors.’280 Armenia, under prolonged blockade
over Nagorno-Karabakh, was never afforded such opportunities; the contrast is an excellent
example of the interaction between the ability to decrease economic dependence and the
apparent permanence of constructed realities. Armed with these Euro-Atlantic investments,
Georgia’s energy dependence on Russia has been practically negated. By 2010, hydrocarbons
were imported overwhelmingly, both in value and volume, from the European Union (Romania
and Bulgaria) and Azerbaijan against Russia’s shrinking share, which had fallen to one-tenth of
total Georgian hydrocarbon imports. Natural gas imports from Azerbaijan alone grew by more
than 11 times between 2010 and 2013.281 As Georgia gets an apportioned, and growing, share of
the total fuel transmitted through the Southern Corridor, recent estimates project that this share
will only continue to grow once the supply chain extends through the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline,
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which will connect Turkey with southern Europe.282 Furthermore, the changes should not be
viewed as an immediate consequence of the 2008 military conflict but as a development that
preceded it. For example, since 2007 Georgia has been a net-exporter of electricity to Russia on
account of concentrated Western and domestic investment into hydroelectric capacities.283
Energy dependence on Russia, once an obvious element of Georgia’s geo-political situation, has
been effectively supplanted by energy dependence on the EU and Azerbaijan.
At least initially, Georgia’s trade dependence on Russia remained an enduring legacy of
the preceding period. Russia was Georgia’s largest bi-lateral importer, although the European
Union as a collective entity had since overtaken Russia. The changing dynamics of comparative
advantage in the post-Soviet space, however, favored reorientation towards superior Western
markets, if available, and Russo-Georgian trade links subsequently declined.284 This dynamic
was supplemented by an intrusion from the security realm. Georgia and Russia engaged in a titfor-tat escalation over Tbilisi's push for NATO membership and for recovery of the secessionist
states, culminating in Russia’s 2006 severance of trade and transport links to Georgia.285 This
imposed a serious cost on Tbilisi and Georgian elites, but Georgia’s trade dependence was not
nearly as extensive as it had been under Gamsakhurdia, and Georgia was able to adjust.
Exporters took advantage of the moment to lay their vestigial dependence on Russia to rest as
they pursued compensatory markets for Georgian goods.286 Saakashvili even boasted that
Georgia had successfully overcame its residual economic dependence and that as a result, the
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“embargo has lost any sense.”287 Until 2012, when relations were normalized under the Georgian
Dream government, Georgian exports to Russia were non-existent. Since then Russia has
accounted for no more than 14 percent of exports and 10 percent of imports. Meanwhile, the EU
has maintained its leadership lead in the Georgian trade market with 27 percent of overall trade
even before the 2015 Association Agreement, which briefly stimulated another uptick in
Georgia-EU trade turnover.288
Three central elements have therefore inverted Georgia’s reliance on Russia into
dependence on the Euro-Atlantic sphere. The first is the strategic importance of FDI in the
Georgian economy and the decisive role that European-directed investment played in
establishing, maintaining, and growing that stakeholdership. The second is the convergence of
domestic efforts to increase energy independence, particularly through the hydroelectric industry,
and Euro-American pipeline strategies. These mutually reinforcing developments enabled
Georgia to break out of its previously extreme hydrocarbon dependence on Russia. The third has
been the deposition of Russia’s formerly predominant role within Georgia’s trade market, mostly
as a function of macroeconomic re-calibration to more competitive markets as well as various
sanctions imposed by Russia as a result of security conflicts emanating from Tbilisi’s EuroAtlantic constructed reality. The net result has been the loss of Russia’s economic position in
Georgia, previously a decisive element (e.g. the CIS) in keeping Georgia connected to Russia
and the post-Soviet space.
Elites and Institutional Engagement in Period 3: Towards the West
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As discussed in the previous section, Saakashvili brought a definitive affiliation with
Euro-Atlantic structures into power. From an economic perspective, the European Union was an
obvious destination for Tbilisi’s desired integration. The EU’s decision to include Georgia (along
with Armenia and Azerbaijan) in its 2004 European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) sparked a
euphoric optimism in Tbilisi that Georgian membership in the European Union was only a matter
of time. Saakashvili remarked that the “EU has recognized that we have a chance of joining the
EU after some time...this may happen quite soon.” He would even proclaim in the presence of
the EU leadership, frequently to little reaction, that Georgia’s ascension was imminent.289 In
reality, the EU’s mechanisms for integration required not only the European political will to
expand into the chaotic South Caucasus, but also underlying commercial and economic linkages.
Although the former tendency has contributed to EU reticence with regards to extending actual
membership, growing economic ties between the European Union and Georgia enabled Tbilisi to
deepen its institutional engagement in the EU’s structure. For example, Tbilisi only qualified for
involvement in the EU Generalized Scheme of Preference Plus (GSP+) program—for Georgia
the predecessor stage before an EU DCFTA—because GSP+ requirements demanded a certain
level of extant trade interconnectivity with the EU.290 Extant and growing trade linkages
therefore provided the platform for elites to deepen their institutional engagement with the
European Union.
At the same time, Tbilisi was taking advantage of underlying economic changes,
particularly rising Western FDI, to simultaneously lessen dependence on Russia and strengthen
its structural relationship with Europe. Georgian elites effectively imagined that they could
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employ their attractive investment environment and translate it into programs that would make
Georgia an indispensable component of the European Union’s energy-security network. The
push for energy independence had gained additional traction when Russia, employing its thenmonopoly on supplying Georgian gas, reacted to Saakashvili's push for NATO membership by
raising gas prices in 2006.291 But Tbilisi was already attracting the sources necessary to
overcome its remaining energy dependence. Saakashvili's government, for example, deployed
the Diplomatic Service to "stimulate Euro-Atlantic interest" in developing pipeline and energy
routes beneficial for the EU. Gela Bezhuashvili, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, noted in the
2006 National Security Concept that a key Georgian priority was “identifying alternative ways of
transporting Caspian Sea energy resources to European markets with the aim of ending Europe’s
dangerous dependence on a single provider [Russia].”292 In this regard, Tbilisi considered itself
as a valuable potential asset in the European economic chassis. Indeed, the Southern Corridor
pipeline forms a variation of institutional deepening, especially since the EU regards it as a
permanent cornerstone of energy policy.293
The 2015 Association Agreement and DCFTA with the European Union represents the
natural culmination of Georgia’s economic linkages with the West and the gradual disintegration
of dependence on Russia. Negotiations commenced in 2010 when trade relations with Russia
were still prohibited as a result of the 2008 war and concluded in 2013. Since September 2014,
and as a result of the DCFTA, the EU has almost completely liberalized imports from Georgia.294
But even before this opening, the European Union was concurrently the largest investor and
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trade partner with Georgia. Georgia's government viewed negotiations as building off extant
economic relations towards the direction of comprehensive integration. In addition, many
political and policy elites, including Kakha Gogolashvili, the Director of the Georgian-European
Policy and Legal Advice Center, view the Association Agreement and the DCFTA as
representing the ‘conclusive’ stage of integration.295 Ivanishvili, in spite of his mildly
conciliatory attitude towards Russia, captured this point when he declared his hopes to “make
Georgia’s EU integration irreversible.”296 Georgia’s successful negotiations and the completion
of an EU Association Agreement should therefore be contrasted against the background of
Armenia’s reversal into the Customs Unions and then the EAEU. The discernible dividing
element was clearly the complete lack of Georgian dependence on Russia, which permitted
flexibility and outreach to the Euro-Atlantic structures without risking economic instability from
such a ‘defection.’
Diagram 3: Economic Dependence and ‘Institutional Engagement’
Country Period Economic Dependence on
Russia/CIS
Armenia
1
High, declining but valuable trade
dependence.
2
High, dependence on investment.
3
Georgia

1
2/3

High, sustained trade and
investment dependence.
High, but declining trade
dependence.
Eventually low, attained by
Western investment attracted by
post-Rose Revolution reforms.

Elite Responses to Dependence (examples)
CIS membership, ruble-zone preservation,
FTAs with FSU states.
Bi-lateral swaps and asset sales with Russia.
CIS FTA, EEU/EAEU (abandonment of EU
Association Agreement).
CIS membership; as dependence decreases,
participation in GUAM to spoil integration.
Southern Corridor pipeline agreements, EU
integration (DCFTA, Association Agreement).
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Discussion: Constructed Realities and Economic Dependence
In the previous sections, it has been shown that identity-driven constructed realities
prejudiced national leadership to divergent blocs and that the degree of contemporary economic
dependence was a primary motivating (and occasionally restraining) factor in their international
trajectories. These two variables, however, should not be considered clearly delimited and
separate. The variables, in fact, frequently reinforced each other and helped confirm the
respective long-term trajectory. To give a broad illustration, the predilection of Georgian elites
for the West was supplemented by a rising Western imprint in the economy. Without economic
interest from the West, which largely supplanted Russian linkages, Georgian elites might not
have had the flexibility to pursue their desired push to the West. Indeed, the evidence from
Georgia’s first period evinces the point: Tbilisi's Euro-Atlantic desire had to be relegated beneath
economic necessity, which demanded at least some initial outreach to Russia (e.g. the CIS)
despite elite discomfort. Armenia provides the counterpoint. Yerevan was unable to attract
sufficient Western investment as a result of a constructed reality that permitted little compromise
over Nagorno-Karabakh and therefore prolonged a damaging blockade. Armenian elites thus
defaulted on their traditional patron—inviting self-reinforcing dependence on Russia that
culminated with their definitive affiliation with Eurasia.
Several specific examples will further illustrate the degree to which these two variables
confirmed national trajectories. Take, for example, Armenian diaspora investors and remittanceproducers in Russia. Almost 2 million Armenians in Russia belong to an organization called the
Union of Armenians in Russia (UAR), led by the wealthy businessman and investor, Ara
Abramian, and many utilize this connection to spend lavishly back in Armenia.297 The UAR
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actively promotes the Eurasianist and pro-Russian beliefs shared by many elites back in Yerevan,
and have employed their substantial economic leverage to encourage institutional engagement
between Armenia and Russia on account of Armenia’s dependence on diaspora-sourced FDI
from Russia.298 For example, Abramian was a decisive influence in the slate of bi-lateral swap
agreements in the early 2000s that deepened relations with Russia and stimulated further
investment.299 Another informative example is Armenia’s membership in the EAEU. In the
previous section the economic motivations behind joining the EAEU were discussed, but
obviously wider security considerations were reflected upon as well. One opposition MP noted
that because of the Turkish blockade that Armenia was presented with “no alternative” and that
Yerevan had to join the EAEU to “maintain its security; our [European] partners must
understand our conditions...we don’t have open borders and they must remember this reality.”300
At the same time, all Armenian political parties argue that Nagorno-Karabakh can only be settled
upon international recognition of Artsakh, an unlikely outcome any time in the near future.301
Armenia’s relatively isolated geo-political situation, a product of its constructed reality, has
therefore pushed Armenia into sustained economic dependence with Russia and reinforced its
theoretical role as Yerevan’s protector. Indeed, the Armenian public near-unanimously support
Russia’s position as Armenia’s “main friend.”302
For Georgia, it was partially Western economic support and investment that enabled
Tbilisi to realize the aspirations of Euro-Atlantic affiliation. To give one example, energy
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dependence was one of the levers employed by Russia to influence Yerevan into the EACU,
although typically Armenian elites invited energy dependence without additional pressure from
Moscow. Raising gas prices was a conventional strategy that Russia had employed to warn
Georgian elites against realizing their Euro-Atlantic ambitions, which would invite NATO to
Russia’s borders against Moscow’s insistences.303 Western investment, however, has enabled
Georgia to strategically overcome this dependence through pipeline construction and domestic
energy production. Russia has few remaining available measures to influence Tbilisi as it did in
Armenia and therefore Georgian elites, unlike their Armenian counterparts, have been able to
pursue Euro-Atlantic outreaches, such as completing an EU Association Agreement. Armenia,
meanwhile, has been deliberately excluded from energy transit networks as a direct result of its
standoff with Azerbaijan and Turkey.
In effect, the decline in economic dependence was an enabling factor for Tbilisi to pursue
its Western proclivity without interference. For Armenia, the experience was inverted as
Yerevan’s ‘complimentary’ predilection proved incompatible with macroeconomic realities that
emanated from their geo-political situation. President Sargsyan summarized that reality best
when he noted: "...since we share a system of military security, it is impossible and inefficient to
isolate ourselves from the corresponding geo-economical space.”304 Formidable pro-Russian
affiliations among the elite, and the necessity of maintaining Moscow’s security paternalism,
ensured that few efforts were undertaken to reverse Armenia’s dependence.
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In reviewing the sources behind national trajectories, two decisive variables have been
examined as determining Armenia’s close cooperation with Russia and Georgia’s defection to
the West. The divergence in the direction of relations reflects the contrasting disposition of
constructed realities between Georgian and Armenian elites as well as their reactions to
alternating levels of economic dependence.
As discussed, within the personality-driven governments of the South Caucasus, the
opinions of leading elites served as a crucial determiner of foreign policy. In both Georgia and
Armenia, political experiences in the pre-Soviet period and the immediate post-Soviet period
conditioned elite visions for their states within the post-Soviet space. For Georgia, the troubling
legacy of Russia as an imperial power and Soviet master was strengthened by Moscow’s alleged
promotion of secessionism. With the addition of an identity-driven affiliation with ‘the West,’
Georgian elites developed a durable constructed reality, Euro-Atlanticism, that endorsed an
interrelated vision of Georgian territorial integrity (recovering the secessionist territories), EuroAtlantic integration (membership in NATO, the EU, etc.), and anti-Russian sentiment. Yerevan’s
inheritance from the pre-Soviet moment was quite similar to that of Tbilisi: the desire for the
recovery of lost territories, a vague ‘complementary’ affiliation to Europe, and concern about
Russian power. But unlike Georgia, Armenian elites also entertained an historically informed
role for Russia as Yerevan’s protector against traditional enemies in Baku and Istanbul. The
prioritization of saving Nagorno-Karabagh induced the adoption of a constructed reality
(Complementary-Eurasianism) that projected Russia as Armenia’s security guarantor and
‘othered’ Turkey and, especially, Azerbaijan. The subsequent imposition of a joint Turkish-Azeri
blockade of Armenia confirmed the necessity of some Eurasian affiliation by deepening
Yerevan’s immediate security and economic dependence on Russia.
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In both countries, the ‘median’ version of each constructed reality has endured among the
political leadership throughout the post-Soviet period. Only Ter-Petroysan, the exception that
proves the rule, resisted that logic while in office (despite his instrumental role in creating the
conditions necessary for the Eurasian-tilt), and he paid the price at the hands of elites committed
to the constructed reality. Otherwise, all leading political figures and ruling parties, including
those that previously hailed from skeptical opposition parties, have conformed to their respective
constructed realities. Such durability has sharpened the divergence in national trajectories by
constant adherence to policies informed by the constructed realities. For Georgia the
predominance of the Euro-Atlanticism among political elites allowed for a sustained push against
intra-FSU integration in the post-Soviet space and towards integration into Western structures.
Within the CIS, for example, Tbilisi played a spoiling role in integrative efforts by aligning with
other skeptical member-states and courting Western attention through GUAM. Later it would
refuse to renew its membership in the CIS’ security treaty, and eventually defected outright at the
nadir of relations with Russia. Armenia’s approach towards post-Soviet linkages was very
different. Political elites in Yerevan reflected their commitment to the constructed reality by
deepening their involvement in post-Soviet structures. The leadership in Yerevan promoted
stronger connections within the CIS, for example, and actively engaged in the CIS’ security
framework. The culmination of the gradual deepening of relations between Armenia and Russia,
represented by the decision of the Sargsyan government (steeped in the Eurasian preference) to
join the EAEU was a stark contrast with Georgia’s experience in post-Soviet linkages.
Outreach to the West was also conditioned by underlying constructed realities. Despite a
general identity-driven affiliation with Europe, Armenia’s national narrative in the post-Soviet
period, centered around Nagorno-Karabagh, precluded any excessive association with blocs
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competing with Russia, best represented by NATO and the EU. Armenian elites therefore
confined their engagement with NATO to technical and cooperative assistance without a longterm aspiration for integration, and made far more limited arrangements with the EU, especially
in comparison to their participation in the EAEU and Georgia’s outreach. Indeed, Tbilisi’s
constructed-reality demanded that the leadership push for the West and ‘break-out’ from
Russia’s post-Soviet vision. At first chance, Shevardnadze pivoted Georgia to the West, and the
political elites continued to prioritize integration into the EU and NATO as an interrelated
function of their desire for territorial sovereignty, their embrace of European identity, and their
anti-Russian sentiments. The constancy of the median constructed reality among Georgian elites
ensured that the Euro-Atlantic foreign policy was maintained, culminating in military conflict
with Russia and deeper integration into Western structures (i.e. the Association Agreement).
The degree of economic dependence on Russia and the post-Soviet also influenced the
divergent trajectories of the two countries. At the initial post-independence stage, trade in both
countries was overwhelmingly dependent on Russia and the CIS. Though this dependence
quickly declined as Georgia and Armenia opened to global markets, elites in both countries
responded to the initial situation by engaging in post-Soviet institutions to stabilize their
precarious economies. Thereafter the trajectory of dependence diverged and accordingly the
responses of elites diverged as well. Georgia attracted significant Western FDI and trade that
encouraged European and Georgian elites to promote further institutional integration,
particularly into EU programs. Georgian elites, certainly prejudiced by their Euro-Atlantic
preferences, also leveraged this advantage to confirm their autonomy by pursuing energy
independence, such as participation in regional pipeline politics and construction. Yerevan, by
contrast, was a major recipient of Russia-directed investment and remittances, and less able to
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adjust to investment and trade conditions favorable to the West during the blockade. Attempts to
attract Western investment into Armenian enterprises repeatedly faltered and thereby accentuated
Armenia’s dependence on Russia. Ruling elites therefore consciously moved closer to Russia in
order to exploit Armenia’s extant dependence for further assistance. For example, they
encouraged the flow of investments by large asset sales to Russian companies. In contrast to the
Georgian push for energy independence, Armenia remained completely dependent on Russian
energy, and elites actively deepened its dependence to gain favorable terms and prices. Just as
Georgia had responded to its rising dependence on the West and declining dependence on Russia
by amplifying its push for Euro-Atlantic integration, Armenian elites responded to economic
dependence by confirming Armenia’s ‘Eurasian’ national trajectory. Certainly by Yerevan’s
2013 decision to join the EACU the value of underlying economic linkages with Russia was
sufficient to enable the Armenian government to definitively align with Moscow.
Two pathways have unfolded as a result of these determining variables. Georgia, largely
integrated into Western networks and guided by a pro-Western political leadership, has remained
fixed on attaining full Euro-Atlantic membership. By contrast, Armenia, heavily dependent on
Russian economic linkages and led by political elites with a sustained commitment to the EAEU,
remains a dependable partner of Russia within the post-Soviet space.

Conclusion
Great powers are rarely paragons of virtue. Russia is certainly no exception to the rule.
But the tendency to view relations in the near abroad as an exclusive function of Russian
initiative denies sufficient attention to determining variables originating from the opposite actor.
Instead, this research has reveals that the direction of relations after the disintegration of the
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USSR reflected small-state elite perceptions, generally inspired by developments in the preSoviet and Soviet era, about the role and form of their nation in the post-Soviet space. In
addition, the evolving degree of economic dependence between the subject states and Russia
either encouraged cooperation and further integration (high dependence) or laid the groundwork
for a definitive ‘defection’ away from Moscow (low dependence). Contrary to the interpretations
put forward by subscribers of the ‘conventional wisdom,’ issues of national identity, territorial
unity, and enduring economic linkages proved far more determinative than any supposition of
Russian aggression in the trajectory of relations. While this research is confined to Georgia and
Armenia, in which the elite personalization of foreign policy is an accepted condition in the
literature, the analytical strategy adopted could theoretically extend across the South Caucasus,
Central Asia, and Eastern Europe, where political elites also share identity-determined
constructed realities and economies are variously dependent or independent of Russia.
From a Western perspective, the implications for this alternative method of examining
the near abroad are appreciable. Western policymakers and leaders have an obvious tendency to
view Russia as a revisionist power in the post-Soviet space. The 2008 war in Georgia, for
example, was largely framed as a struggle between ‘David vs Goliath’ with Russia cast in the
role of obvious aggressor. Little attention was afforded to the militant desire by Georgian elites
to recover the secessionist territories nor Tbilisi's almost chiliastic Euro-Atlantic push to
integrate into the West and draw associated security and economic institutions against Russia’s
border. As for Armenia, its extensive association with Russia is frequently framed as the
nefarious product of Russian coercion. Such an attitude would certainly come as some surprise to
many Armenian elites, who see Russia as the indispensable partner both in security and
economic spheres. Indeed, as this research has sought to illustrate, neither Georgia’s ‘defection’
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nor Armenia’s ‘co-operation’ have been the direct consequence of sustained Russian bellicosity,
but the product of longer-term trajectories affected by elites and evolving economic linkages.
The reality of small-state driven trajectories, informed by the experiences of Georgia and
Armenia, necessitates a re-appraisal of Russia’s geo-political posture in the near abroad. First,
Russia and FSU states share innumerable legacies from the Soviet period. These issues,
discussed in this paper, can range from economic configuration to national identity. The extent of
overlapping experience merits a return to President Medvedev’s earlier claim that the ‘near
abroad’ is defined by its status as a ‘reciprocal zone of interest.’ Naturally the claim somewhat
oversimplifies all relationships between Russia and post-Soviet states; the Georgian leadership
might define it instead as a reciprocal zone of conflict. But for many FSU states the assertion
rings true. Armenia’s post-independence political leadership has placed a strategic premium on
the relationship with Russia, and they would certainly view Russia’s actions in the near abroad
vis-à-vis Armenia as indicative of a ‘reciprocal interest.’ Other states in the near abroad, such as
Kyrgyzstan (another landlocked EAEU member), share the view from Yerevan. Only dramatic
over-simplifications reduce the amenability of these states to Russia and its integrative postSoviet program as the exclusive product of Russian imperialism. Even at the opposite end of the
spectrum, such as in Ukraine or Georgia, the legacy of pre-Soviet, Soviet, and immediate postSoviet experiences are palpable in instigating conflict. Nor are these examples strictly
informative about Russian culpability; the Georgian government demonstrated, for example, a
constant proclivity for forceful recovery of the secessionist territories and a fixed desire for EuroAtlantic integration, despite understandable Russian concerns about a new NATO presence on
their southern border.
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Though inconceivable in the present political environment, the United States and the
West should adjust both their conception of Russia’s position in the near abroad and policies
affecting Russia's role in the region. By re-evaluating Russia’s role in the post-Soviet space from
an imperial power to a great power within a framework of shared regional interests, the West can
pivot away from an aggravating position of excessive confrontation and misplaced alarm towards
Moscow. Any assumption that the re-constitution of the Soviet empire is Russia’s raison d'etre
misses the subtler pattern of Russian policy in the post-Soviet space, more focused on
institutional integration and strengthening post-Soviet linkages than fomenting trouble for
expansionist ambitions. In conflict areas, Russian policy, as in Georgia, has tended to follow a
reactive pathway, obscuring claims that Moscow’s aggression has warranted intrusion by the
West. In fact, the expansion of NATO, especially in the post-Soviet period, constitutes a far
more provocative measure than Russia could ever produce against the West. It is little surprise
then that Russia has quarreled with states that have participated in the eastward expansion of
Euro-Atlantic structures, which it views as interfering in the ‘reciprocal zones of interest’ and
promoting conflict by affording protection to querulous elites, as in Tbilisi. The unclear
advantages of a permanent Western intrusion into the post-Soviet space—producing in many
cases an unnecessary escalation of tensions between the United States and Russia—merits
reconsideration. Instead, the United States and the West should focus on collaborative and
developmental efforts to build a partnership with Russia, rather than normalize a fixed and
unproductive enmity by disregarding legitimate Russian interests in the near abroad.
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